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 1.  Everything Should be Made as Simple as Possible, But Not Simpler, QUOTE 
INVESTIGATOR, http://quoteinvestigator.com/2011/05/13/einstein-simple/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/X4FS-72KL (last visited Sept. 14, 2015) (paraphrasing Albert Einstein).  
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INTRODUCTION 
This note examines complex litigation with the goal of providing 
practical options for its management.  It is written from a judge’s 
perspective.  While it does not consider problems unique to lawyers, such 
as funding, document management, coordination with other counsel and so 
on, it will arm lawyers with a sense of what at least some judges are trying 
to do, or say they are trying to do.  Lawyers, as well as judges, may find 
useful the strategies discussed in the latter part of the note.  Because 
experiments in the complex area may spread to other cases,2 the issues 
noted here may be of interest outside the complex arena.  And this note 
may also be useful to those outside the law interested to see how complex 
mechanisms actually play out in the legal context. 
As I say, I have tried for a practical approach.  I borrow and cite from 
academic literature as useful, but no more.  As many have noted, there is a 
divergence between the interests of academia and the needs of the courts 
and practicing lawyers,3 and I work here for the latter crowd. 
I have been inspired by work in the field—or fields—of complexity 
theory, but I claim no more than inspiration.  As with complex systems, 
litigation (1) is made up of pieces: parties, motions, pleadings, arguments, 
and so on; (2) is a function of generally deterministic rules; (3) generates 
systems with emergent attributes, not just extrapolations of their elements; 
and (4) leads to unpredictable results. Litigation has complex feedback 
loops, may suffer from tight coupling, and can be defined (or at least 
 
 2.  See generally Jay Tidmarsh, Civil Procedure: The Last Ten Years, 46 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 503 (1996) (discussing trends in civil procedure). 
 3.  See, e.g., James L. Oakes, Commentary on Judge Edwards’ “Growing Disjunction 
Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession”, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2163 (1993) 
(discussing the teaching of legal ethics); Bryan A. Garner, Interview of Chief Justice John 
G. Roberts, Jr., 13 SCRIBES J. LEG. WRITING 5, 37 (2010), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/garner-transcripts-1.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Y32H-BS99 (“I think it’s extraordinary these days—the tremendous 
disconnect between the legal academy and the legal profession.  They occupy two different 
universes.  What the academy is doing, as far as I can tell, is largely of no use or interest to 
people who actually practice law.  Whether it’s analytic, whether it’s at whatever level 
they’re operating, it doesn’t help the practitioners or help the judges.”) 
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analyzed) by the flow of information from one piece or phase to the next—
these are features of many complex systems.  I will discuss these features 
below.  But this is still all analogy, and I will use it just as long as it is 
useful.4 
And it is useful, I think, as an aid in the diagnosis of the problems of 
complex litigation.  It is easy to think either that all complex litigation 
shares common attributes (many parties and issues, frequent trips to the 
courtroom) pointing us to a series of common approaches (frequent case 
management conferences, informal discovery conferences); or that every 
case is unique, and needs an entirely improvised attack.  Neither of these is 
correct.  There are patterns.  Complexity theory inspires a review of 
problems and argues their categorization; it helps us focus on the animating 
features of a case, and so in turn helps us manage it as efficiently, and 
fairly, as we can.  Medicine has its differential diagnosis, a process by 
which the symptoms are collected, and used to identify the disease.  Some 
diseases have similar symptoms, but (we hope) not all the symptoms are 
features of more than one disease.  Diseases repeat, and if we know their 
symptoms, we can diagnose.  So too, as we look to the features of various 
complex cases, we can isolate the animating aspects and target our efforts 
appropriately, treating the right condition and avoiding judicial control that 
will not, actually, help. 
 
 4.  That is, it doesn’t matter whether the law, or a part of it, or its processes, really are 
or are not complex systems.  Compare, e.g., Carla Crandall, If You Can’t Beat Them, Kill 
Them: Complex Adaptive Systems Theory and the Rise in Targeted Killing, 43 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 595, 608 (2013) (“[M]uch of the complexity associated with complex adaptive 
systems derives from the fact that these systems are comprised of various interrelated and 
interdependent agents of components.  So it is with the legal system.”), with R. George 
Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity: An Explanation of Why the Law Can’t Just Be Less 
Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 715, 744 (1999-2000) (“Ultimately, the law is as simple or 
as complex as it is, in whatever respect, because that degree of simplicity or complexity is 
consistent with the current, broad balance of legal and political forces.”), and D. Bourcier, et 
al., Toward Measures Of Complexity In Legal Systems, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH INT’L 
CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & LAW, 211 (2007), http://portal.acm.org/
citation.cfm?id=1276359, archived at http://perma.cc/4N9T-CVCZ (noting that describing 
the legal system as a complex system is “at best inspired by some analogy with 
characterizations of complex systems in mathematics, physics or ecology” and proposing 
the development of a “structure-based” measure and “content-based” measure to measure 
the complexities of the legal system).  See generally Jeffrey Rudd, J.B. Ruhl’s “Law-and-
Society System”: Burying Norms and Democracy Under Complexity Theory’s Foundation, 
29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 551, 551-52 & n.2 (2005) (discussing the 
problems that plague the modern regulatory state).  Some academic material is helpful in 
mapping out the sorts of complexities (in the less technical sense) that affect the law but 
their recommendations are too vague to be useful to lawyers and judges.  See, e.g., Peter H. 
Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, And Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1 (1992) 
(defining a complex legal system as one whose rules, processes, institutions and supporting 
culture have density, technicality, differentiation, and indeterminacy). 
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In Section II, I review the definition of a “complex” case and isolate 
and explain its emphasis on the need for a judge to manage the case.  
Section III provides a brief description of complex systems generally, 
offering a series of characteristics that help, at least by analogy, analyze 
complex litigation.  I use Section IV to argue that the focus of the court’s 
work in complex cases should be on settlement, and I introduce the notion 
of the early inflection point as a point, or points, in the life of a case—short 
of trial—where settlement is reasonable.  Section V uses two fictional cases 
to rough out the essential, and striking, differences between simple and 
complex cases, and in so doing begins the process of mapping out just what 
it is that makes a case complex.  I break Section VI into two parts, each 
addressing a series of specific characteristics or aspects (symptoms, one 
might say) of complex cases, explaining how these affect the progress of 
the case.  Then in Section VII, I explore the many tools and techniques 
judges have to manage and ameliorate the aspects and characteristics of 
complex cases.  Section VIII concludes with a last look at the distinction 
between “outlier” and “core” issues as a general guide-post to the work of a 
complex judge. 
I. DEFINITION OF COMPLEX CASE 
The definition of a “complex” case is not just an academic exercise.  
In its identification of characteristics, it leads us to useful management 
techniques. 
I, of course, first turned to the state rules and had intended to mock 
them, just a little, as tautological.  For purposes of deciding when to assign 
cases to a complex judge, the rules define a complex case as one that 
requires such a judge: 
A “complex case” is an action that requires exceptional judicial 
management to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the court 
or the litigants and to expedite the case, keep costs reasonable, 
and promote effective decision making by the court, the parties, 
and counsel.5 
The factors suggestive of a need for such a judge are these: 
“(1) Numerous pretrial motions raising difficult or novel legal 
issues that will be time-consuming to resolve; (2) Management of 
a large number of witnesses or a substantial amount of 
 
 5.  CAL. R. CT. 3.400(a).  For a short history of the events that led to the creation of the 
complex courts in California, see Mitchell L. Bach, et al., A History of the Creation and 
Jurisdiction of Business Courts in the Last Decade, 60 BUS. LAW. 147, 206 (2004) 
(discussing the creation of specialized business courts in the United States). 
ARTICLE 1 (KARNOW) (DO NOT DELETE) 12/31/15  1:24 PM 
2015] COMPLEXITY IN LITIGATION 5 
 
documentary evidence; (3) Management of a large number of 
separately represented parties; (4) Coordination with related 
actions pending in one or more courts in other counties, states, or 
countries, or in a federal court; or (5) Substantial post judgment 
judicial supervision.”6 
All this is not quite a tautology, for it comes to rest on the rationale for 
complex designation: the need for judicial intervention.  This is a 
recognition that the usual rules—and in California, we have a lot of them, 
from legislatively-prescribed discovery procedures, rules of court, a code of 
civil procedure, and laws found in other codes as well—won’t work.  The 
typical self-enforcement mechanisms of discovery, even augmented by 
discovery motions, and the economic incentives of the parties to get to trial 
or settle, won’t work.  Left to their own devices, the lawyers, operating in 
the interests of their clients as they are meant to do, will create vast 
inefficiencies both for themselves and the court which ultimately tries the 
case.  Professor Tidmarsh identifies the pertinent “dysfunctions,” and the 
consequent need for judicial intervention: “The hypothesis of 
complexity . . . holds that an essential attribute of complex litigation is 
lawyer, factfinder, or party dysfunction remediable by an assertion of 
judicial power . . . .”7 
This insight meshes with that extracted from complexity theory: a 
complex system in effect takes on a life of its own, an unpredictable and 
sometimes dangerous life of its own.  External supervision is required to 
prevent this.  I briefly develop the complex systems analogy below, Section 
III. 
In the usual case, lawyers run the whole show up to trial.  Judges only 
 
 6.  CAL. R. CT. 3.400(b).  The definition often includes these sorts of cases: class 
actions, securities fraud, mass tort, construction defect, insurance coverage with multiple 
policies, construction defect, and multi-party cases generally. 
 7.  Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the 
Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1789 (1992).  See generally, Jack 
Friedenthal, Tackling Complex Litigation, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1301, 1310 & n.20 
(1999) (reviewing Jay Tidmarsh & Roger H. Trangsrud, COMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE 
ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1998)).  Tidmarsh exposes not just lawyer dysfunction, but also that 
of (i) the jury as it tries to do its fact finding function in a complex case, Tidmarsh, supra, at 
1766, and (ii) the parties, id. at 1773.  See also Jay Tidmarsh, Looking Forward, 1 SEDONA 
CONF. J. 1, 4 (2000) (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures have revolutionized 
thoughts about procedure).  It is important to state that by “dysfunction” neither Professor 
Tidmarsh nor I suggest disapproval or reproach.  Rather, the suggestion is this: we 
ordinarily expect the legitimate incentives and capabilities of parties, lawyers, juries and 
others involved in a lawsuit together to produce justice, we might say, “the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 1.  To some 
extent in many cases, but in particular in complex cases, that expectation is insupportable 
(absent the judicial intervention discussed in this note). 
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decide when an issue is offered up at the instigation of and on timing set by 
the parties.  The primary job of the judge is to decide legal issues.  An 
example of a mundane motion may help distinguish this usual case from 
the complex one.  In the usual case, there is no stay of discovery and if on 
the rare occasion one is sought, it is by way of noticed motion.  That’s 
about three to four weeks’ notice of hearing, moving, opposition, and reply 
papers, supported by declarations and often authenticated exhibits, and then 
oral argument.  In large metropolitan areas, the motion will probably cost 
thousands of dollars to brief and argue.  In a complex case, there may be 
reasons to stop and start discovery, to phase it, to have some but not all 
issues subject to discovery; handling these request in the usual way would 
be, to put it as mildly as I can, inefficient.  So these issues are often handled 
at case management conferences, or a phone call; perhaps five minutes, and 
no filings, may be needed. 
That most common of beasts, the demurrer, provides another simple 
example.  In a routine case, the demurer is filed, ruled on, leave to amend 
may be given, a new complaint is filed and perhaps is then subject to 
another demurrer.  The judge simply rules on these as they come.  In more 
complicated cases, different parties come into the case at different times 
and may file demurrers to different versions of the complaint; rulings as to 
one may be moot or conflict with rulings as to another.  In these situations 
the judge must interfere, stop the uncoordinated filings, and synchronize all 
demurrers to be heard at the same time.8 
Below in Section V, I provide a more detailed contrast between the 
simple and complex case.  Here, I only note the key distinction: the 
interventionist role of the judge in the complicated case as a result of the 
failure of the usual rules of procedure and the inefficiencies of the usual 
roles of the participants.  This distinction defines the complex case. 
Judges in complex cases also have a concomitant role: reducing the 
special types of uncertainty that complex cases exhibit.  Uncertainty is a 
principal cost of complexity. 
Of courses, all cases have uncertainty built into them.9  Disputed facts, 
 
 8.  Complexity in this sense is a creature of trial courts, not appellate courts.  This sort 
of complexity is a function of the intersection between the law (court opinions and statutes) 
and the practicalities of its implementation, which are rarely considered in any detail by the 
appellate courts and the legislature, although the issues are often considered by those 
drafting the statewide and local rules of court. 
 9.  Quite aside from our intuitions about this, it may be formally (i.e., inevitably) true 
as well.  See Hillel Bavli, Note, Applying the Laws of Logic to the Logic of Laws, 33 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 937 (2005) (“[A]pplication of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem to the 
legal context would establish a priori limitations on the capacity for consistency to exist 
within the law, as well as on the faculty to establish internal logical consistency within the 
law.”). 
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conflicting ways to apply the law to the facts, ranges of potential damages 
(such as for pain and suffering and punitive damages), whether the jury will 
believe a key witnesses—all these, and more, make even the simplest case 
uncertain and so susceptible to a range of reasonable settlement values.  
Increasing complexity makes this worse: 
As the complexity of legal regulation has grown, predicting the 
outcome of adjudication in such cases has become more difficult.  Law has 
become “more indeterminate,” in the sense that litigants and judges “have 
less faith that legal doctrine provides a single right answer.”10 
In a complex case, prediction within any plausible range may be 
impossible.  This is often true as the case begins, if for example a theory 
new to the law is pled, the potential liability of a host of defendants is 
utterly unclear (and so their proportionate liability), or the facts are so 
many and so dense it is not clear any trial can ever handle them.  In some 
cases (such as mass torts) the threat of defendants’ bankruptcy, the 
uncertain interplay of overlapping insurance policies, the potential impact 
of related litigation,11 or other overarching issues may make it impossible to 
rely on a traditional evaluation of a case.  Obviated here is the conceit that 
litigation will, if properly processed, reach the “right” result as if it were a 
foreordained truth (like the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant, or 
the truth of who, in a car accident case, ran the red light).  The “right” 
result in many cases, and certainly in many complex cases, will be the 
consequence of bargaining, influenced perhaps heavily by court decisions, 
many of which will be on the tumultuous edge of developing law, but also 
by extra-legal concerns such as reputation, available resources and 
opportunity costs, and so on. 
But there is more.  Parties and lawyers believe that the other side will 
play off the infinite intricacies of procedural law, designed to produce a fair 
substantive result, to undermine a fair result.  Parties know that complexity 
encourages the pursuit of outlier issues, it can slow down litigation, 
refocusing on procedural disputes (the resolution of which is unlikely to 
change a party’s views on a reasonable settlement) and away from 
substantive disputes (the resolution of which should propel parties towards 
settlement).  This, in turn, increases uncertainty and decreases faith that 
settlement will reflect the “true” value of the case. 
Parties in complex cases do have a powerful resistance to reaching the 
 
 10.  John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 
YALE L.J. 522, 558 (2012) (quoting Marc Galanter, “. . . A Settlement Judge, Not a Trial 
Judge:” Judicial Mediation in the United States, 12 J.L. SOC’Y 1, 14 (1985)).  
 11.  Findings in other case may have a preclusive effect in the present case under 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.  These doctrines may block (or “preclude”) 
litigation of issues already decided in another case. 
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merits too early; the tendency is to pause, search the whole terrain for 
possibly useful facts, investigate each potentially useful theory, and only 
then gingerly approach the merits.  The stakes are high; the issues are 
many, some unprecedented; caution is the watchword.  There may be 
serious uncertainty as to exactly what the issues are, and so how to cabin 
discovery and other aspects of the case.12  It is child’s play to demand or 
produce an overwhelming number of documents, depositions or 
interrogatories, to file weak motions, to condition progress in the case on 
other events such as litigation in other jurisdictions, to interpose (and 
invent) myriad claims and defenses, bring in other entities as cross 
defendants or at least the targets of discovery subpoenas.  Some of this is 
bad behavior, but much of it is not. 
These complex procedures result in uncertainty, perpetuated by delay.  
Judges can ameliorate this. 
II. COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
I do not insist that complex litigation is “complex” in the technical 
sense, but at the risk of conflating the two uses of the term, I have thought 
it useful to briefly outline the usual characteristics of complex systems.  
The analogy is useful, and my outline of specific types of complex cases at 
Section VI will borrow from this, as well as providing a visceral feel for the 
sorts of uncertainty lurking in complex cases.  In turn, this analogy will 
help explain some of the solutions mapped out in Section VII. 
Complex systems include population dynamics, weather and the 
turbulent flow of a river or stream, the brain’s electrical activity, evolution, 
some computer expert systems (i.e. software which generates expert 
opinions), financial markets, the immune system, the internet, and so on.13  
Their basic architecture is a network of elements which together function in 
ways not directly predicable from the behavior of the elements as such, 
although at the same time the action of the elements as such may be wholly 
 
 12.  See Keith Broyles, Taking the Courtroom into the Classroom: A Proposal for 
Educating the Lay Juror in Complex Litigation Cases, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 714, 720 
(1996) (quoting Tidmarsh, supra note 8). 
 13.  M. E. J. Newman, Complex Systems: A Survey, 79 AM. J. PHYS. 800 (2011); see 
Melanie Mitchell, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR 12-13 (2009) (discussing the 
commonalities among complex systems when examined at a higher level of generality).  
Complicated systems are not necessarily complex.  Complicated may just mean many parts, 
say, reviewing a dozen elements and fifteen sub-elements to see if all elements of a cause of 
action have been proved.  Complex systems include a lot of moving parts, i.e. parts which 
affect each other in unpredictable ways, as outlined in the text.  Outside of this section 
where I introduce the technical sense of “complex,” I will not keep the two terms strictly 
distinct. 
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deterministic.  Fluid dynamics, which studies fluids such as turbulent water 
as well as the weather, provides a straightforward example.  The behavior 
of the elements, such as air or water molecules, as affected by their 
environments (which might be constraints such as earth and stones) is 
determined; any given movement is, in isolation, predictable and governed 
by the immutable law of physics.  But the overall patterns of the turbulent 
river or weather are unpredictable.  Rather, they can be approximated, and 
the odds of a given configuration might be calculable, but the actions of the 
overall system cannot be, practically, calculated, and the overall system has 
fundamental descriptors that are not descriptions of the constituent 
elements.  This higher-level set of characteristics is sometimes referred to 
as emergent.  For example, one might say of a body that it is beautiful, or 
of a brain that it is smart, but these terms would not be useful in describing 
a cell or synapse.  Beauty and intelligence are emergent qualities. 
In complex systems, the components influence each other in many 
ways.  They influence each other reciprocally (so that elements A and B 
influence each other), collectively (A and B together influence C, which 
may then influence A), differently (A’s influence on C is high, while B’s 
influence is low) and divergently (A inhibits C, but B encourages C).  Each 
of these elements (A, B, C) may be made up of constituents; that is, some 
complex systems are systems of systems.  The brain is a fair example of all 
of these sorts of interactions.  Neurons interact with each other: many will 
influence one, and that one may be part of a group that influences the 
former set; some neurons inhibit, and others excite, the cells to which they 
are connected; and so on. 
We commonly see in complex systems: (a) complicated feedback 
loops that can act as sophisticated information processing schemes and (b) 
no central control—that is, as indicated, the emergent behavior is the result 
of the amalgam of elements, not of a supervisory module.  Some complex 
systems give rise to adaptive behavior; that is, they change according to the 
environment.  Evolution itself is of course the prime example, but to some 
extent one sees this in the flocking behavior of birds, ant colonies, financial 
markets, cities, and expert systems. 
Finally, some complex systems are highly sensitive to changes in 
initial conditions, or indeed subsequent inputs, and these decisive inputs 
may not be perceptible, and their impact may not be predicable (although it 
may be discerned after the fact).  The term “chaotic” may be applied to 
describe this feature.  Very slight changes in the speed and direction of 
water molecules may create profoundly different patterns, including the 
transition from non-turbulent to turbulent conditions.  Local weather is 
highly dependent on slight changes in conditions, and slight changes in the 
number of prey or food sources may have catastrophic impacts on 
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populations. 
For a visceral view of this, consider traffic: a small (but unpredictably 
small) number of extra cars on the road transforms a smooth trip to the stop 
and start behavior of commute hours.  The smallest variation in billiards—
the speed of the cue’s strike, the precise point and angle at which the ball is 
hit—may make an enormous difference to the movement. 
I summarize the relevant aspects of complex systems.  First, knowing 
everything there is to know about the composition, the elements, or the 
parts is not enough to predict the behavior of the whole, and this is even 
more so when the whole system changes over time, adapting to new 
conditions.  Second, there is no central control.  Third, concomitantly, the 
behavior of complex systems may be unpredictable, and very small 
changes, including changes we do not register as such, can have a 
significant impact. 
III. MANAGING CASES TOWARDS SETTLEMENT 
Most cases settle.  The odds of a complex case settling are even 
higher.14 Thus the judge’s time is best spent managing cases towards 
settlement.  This obviously also involves trial preparation, for the case may 
end up there, but usually the critical trial-related preparation is that which 
plainly alerts the parties to the value of the case, and so brings settlement 
closer. 
Since the case will likely terminate with settlement, the central issue 
is: What must be done to get to settlement? Judges should at least allude to 
this at each case management conference.  In most cases, settlement is 
furthered by reducing uncertainty to such an extent that the parties do not 
think it worthwhile to continue litigation.  Phrased this way, we can 
 
 14.  See Complex Litigation: Key Findings from the California Pilot Program, 3 NAT’L 
CTR. FOR ST. CT.’S, CIVIL ACTION, Winter 2004, at 4 (describing the likelihood of complex 
cases settling).  Very few class actions go to trial.  See CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE 
OF THE COURTS, FINDINGS OF THE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION LITIGATION, 2000-
2006 at 11-12 (2009), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/class-action-lit-study.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/8HLA-ZTZ6 (“This analysis highlights another unique trait of 
class action litigation in that class action cases very rarely proceed through trial to a verdict.  
Only seven-tenths of one percent of cases in the sample ended in a trial verdict, and, of 
these, only two cases reached trial with a certified class.  This is considerably lower than the 
8.6% average trial disposition rate for all unlimited civil cases in the study courts over the 
same time period”).  See Peter H. Schuck, Judicial Avoidance of Juries in Mass Tort 
Litigation, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 479, 486-87 (1998) (“The asymmetric incentives and the risk 
aversion exhibited by mass tort plaintiffs (and their lawyers) and by mass tort defendants 
evidently exert a powerful gravitational pull away from trials and toward settlement 
despite—or perhaps because of—the enormous legal, factual, and procedural uncertainties 
surrounding these cases”). 
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generate a paradox: litigation should be costless—friction free.  For surely 
costly time-consuming litigation is bad.  On the other hand, costless 
litigation means we may never reach the point where settlement makes 
sense.  To be sure, litigation would still stop when one side was offered at 
least as much as it thought it might win at trial.  But for the other side to 
settle, the parties must either suffer from an asymmetry of information such 
that settlement at a certain dollar figure is seen as favorable to both sides, 
or they must be so close to both symmetrical information and perfect 
information (i.e. both sides have virtually all of the information there is, 
and it is (of course) the same information.  I call this the “perfect case”) 
that merely the waste of time of continuing what is otherwise costless 
litigation is enough to convince them to settle.  Practically, these latter 
situations do not exist: parties almost never have the same (symmetric) 
information, and never perfect information, because the latter must include 
knowing, for example, the make-up of the jury, how the court will exercise 
discretion in each decision, and so on.  It requires being able to foretell the 
future. 
Entirely costless litigation, therefore, is not possible (litigation takes 
time if nothing else) nor is desirable.  The cost of litigation expands the 
settlement range making it reasonable to factor in the cost of litigation and 
so augment the range of reasonable settlements.  So, for example, if 
litigation costs $10, and plaintiff expects to win $50, then any settlement 
from $41 and up is good.  A converse calculation may be made for 
defendant: if her costs too are $10, then any settlement costing $9 or less is 
good.  When the odds of prevailing and a likely verdict are factored in, a 
range can be generated of settlements which are good for both sides, and 
that is the point: unlike settlement of a perfect case, which has a single 
point for reasonable settlement (and equals the actual result after full 
litigation), real cases with imperfect information have a range.  That range 
is the settlement envelope.15 
 
 15.  This has also been described as a “surplus” the parties can divide to create a 
reasonable outcome.  See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical 
Study of Predictors of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 319-20 (1999) 
(describing as “surplus,” the total costs saved had the parties in a particular case settled 
rather than take the matter to trial).  For more on settlement envelopes and how they are 
affected by various strategies, see Curtis Karnow, Conflicts of Interest and Institutional 
Litigants, 32 J. LEGAL PROF. 7 (2008) (discussing how the settlement strategies of 
institutional litigants serve long-term priorities at the expense of short-term, seemingly 
irrational settlement agreements).  Early settlement is preferred to late settlement; among 
other reasons, because the settlement envelope shrinks as fees and costs are expended.  
Costs become sunk, and the $10 in the text shrinks to $8, $3, and so on.  See generally 
Curtis Karnow, Timing Settlement (2011), 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=curtis_karnow, 
archived at http://perma.cc/KF5Z-QW37 (offering a brief survey of empirical studies 
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But note this: if the parties do not think they have a perfect case (and 
they never do), then each knows, by definition, that the other side might 
accept a less favorable (to the other party) settlement than the one the first 
party is about to accept.  This is the fear of “leaving something on the 
table.” So if plaintiff knows defendant is willing to offer $X, then plaintiff 
also has reason to think that something better than $X might be possible.  
Every settlement of an imperfect case (and that means every actual case) 
risks leaving something on the table (unless and until a credible ultimate 
“bottom line” figure is offered). 
The trick then is not precisely to make litigation costless, even if that 
were feasible.  It is to get to a certain point in the litigation where 
settlement is reasonable, and to get there as fast and as cost-free as 
possible, but for the subsequent costs to be relatively high.  I will call that 
point the inflection point.  An unfortunate instance of this is what actually 
happens in the real world.  The moment before trial is often seen as the 
inflection point.  Lawyers and parties seem willing to spend whatever it 
takes to get to trial, but fear trial itself as both a decisive and very 
expensive moment in the case.  Thus it is that so many cases settle just 
before trial (“on the courthouse steps,” as the legal wags have it).16  This 
standard model is lousy, but it survives because it lives off a classic 
cognitive fallacy: compressed costs and risks are noticed more than when 
they are spread out.  We notice (and fear) the airplane crash in which 250 
people are killed at the same instant, and ignore the 250 people killed at 
railway crossings each year.  As with cost, so too risk: we attend closely to 
the compressed risk of a single investment with a 50% chance of going 
bad, but perhaps ignore the risks of gambling over a multi-year period with 
a similar risk of loss.  So, too, we figure the costs of trial, in time and 
money, but often fail to map out the pretrial work in identifiable, and 
priced, chunks.  In any event, working towards an inflection point 
substantially earlier than trial–an early inflection point (“EIP”) I will term 
it–is difficult because the moment before trial remains a competing 
inflection point, and because the moment before trial remains symbolically 
the moment when the parties are closest to perfect and symmetrical 
information—closest to the perfect case.  That, in turn, means (if the parties 
are drinking their own Kool-Aid) that it is not until just before trial that a 
settlement is most likely not to leave anything on the table, which in turn is 
taken to mean that it is just before trial that one is most likely to get the best 
settlement.  That estimate of perfect timing is fallacious in many cases (this 
 
regarding how best to time mandatory settlement conferences). 
 16.  See generally Andrew J. Wistrich et al., How Lawyers’ Intuitions Prolong 
Litigation, 86 S. CA. L. REV. 571, 571 (2013) (discussing why many cases do not settle until 
the eve of trial, or “on the courthouse steps”). 
ARTICLE 1 (KARNOW) (DO NOT DELETE) 12/31/15  1:24 PM 
2015] COMPLEXITY IN LITIGATION 13 
 
is the Kool-Aid) because it does not account for: (1) the now sunk costs of 
arriving at that “perfect” moment; (2) the fact that events since what could 
have been an EIP might have made things worse on the merits for at least 
one of the parties; (3) the moment before trial is only the roughest proxy 
for a perfect case, because much uncertainty still remains, and as we will 
see in complex cases, always remains.17 
So we arrive at the basic question for the court: how do we help the 
parties quickly reach an EIP?  How do we make it as cheap and fast as 
possible to get to this point with the threat of relatively great expense and 
risk thereafter?  That is the problem.  There is something difficult, or 
complex about the case that blocks the parties from reaching an EIP, a 
point at which much material information is shared, but (obviously) 
uncertainty still remains.  A case that is close, but not too close, to a perfect 
case; indeed, as far back (at least in time) from a perfect case as we can 
manage; where we have resolved just enough of the uncertainty. 
I propose an inventory of these types of impediments—the 
characteristics of what we might call “complex” cases, and other cases.  
These are what in a general way make cases “hard.”  It is important to tease 
these out because there are different solutions to different conditions.  
Taking a metaphor from medicine, we examine a case and create a 
differential diagnosis, a list of attributes that suggests the problem to be 
solved and the remedy to employ. 
IV. EXEMPLARS: SIMPLE AND COMPLEX (COMPLICATED) CASES 
But first let us gain some insight into what makes cases hard by 
contrasting a simple and a complex case. 
The “simple” case is a small drug possession case.  The officer saw 
the defendant jaywalking, detained him, says he was given consent to 
search the man’s backpack, and found a small amount of drugs.  It is a 
misdemeanor.  In contrast to what we may call a complex case, this 
misdemeanor case has the following characteristics:  there are at most a 
couple of fact issues such as the credibility of the arresting officer, which 
will likely dictate the results of the suppression hearing as well as the jury 
verdict.  The credibility of the defendant might be at stake, but probably 
not, as he is unlikely to testify.  In a rare case, the nature of the drugs (or 
perhaps their quantity) might be at issue.  There are a few legal issues such 
as the standards under the Fourth Amendment for a detention, and whether 
the defendant’s words and actions really were tantamount to consent 
 
 17.  In class actions, we have an EIP just as the certification motion is being filed.  The 
stakes are so high in such a motion that parties frequently parlay the uncertainty of a result 
into settlement. 
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(assuming the officer is telling the truth).  There might be an issue whether 
there was a prejudicial delay in the prosecution, requiring a speedy trial 
analysis, but probably not.  The lawyers and the judge in this case have 
done all this before: previous fact patterns have been almost identical, and 
the legal issues are, in fact, identical to those in prior cases.  The outcomes 
available in this case are very limited: the defendant will either be acquitted 
or found guilty, and although there are of course many variations among 
locales—and it may depend on whether he pleads out or is convicted by the 
jury—the sentence in the specific court is probably highly predictable: 
there is, as one might say, a “market,” and the players (the judges and 
lawyers) know the price for the crime.  The simpler and more common the 
crime, the better known the market, and thus the more predictable the 
outcome. 
What else can we say about this simple case? As a function of the 
limited number of legal issues, which have been frequently visited in the 
past, the law is stable.  It is unlikely that a new appellate decision will need 
to be reviewed.  And as a function of this it is pretty clear what the line is 
between issues where review will be de novo (such as on the legal issues 
outlined above) and those area where the trial judge has discretion, such as 
fact finding in the suppression hearing, sentencing within a given range, 
and the usual evidentiary issues.  In other words, it is generally clear what 
type of decision is at stake, including the nature of the decision maker 
(judge, jury), the factors to be considered, the nature of appellate review, 
and thus the sort of record one is expected to make.  Moreover, appellate 
review will occur once: after judgment.  It will probably be based on the 
harmless error rule with the key trial determinations (the result of the 
suppression hearing and the jury verdict) likely upheld as within the 
discretion of those factfinders.18 
The complex case (here I use the term “complex” in a non-technical 
sense) is just the opposite of the misdemeanor.  If the drug possession case 
is typical of the simple matter, what is typical of the complex matter? 
Nothing is, and that is the point.  Each case is different from the next.  Even 
 
 18.  Of course, even this “simple” case may not be free of difficult problems for the 
lawyers and the judge.  Jury selection and maintenance raise a host of problems that must be 
decided on the spot, such as bias in selection, detecting bias in the jurors, communications 
among jurors and others, and simply managing the lives of all these people for a few days 
can be stressful.  Incompetent lawyers, or those who have decided the best tactic to is 
antagonize the trial judge, defendants’ complaints about lawyers (competent or not) and 
their sometime wishes to represent themselves, all contribute the difficulties of any criminal 
trial, as do sometime difficult evidentiary issues.  The trial of a “simple” misdemeanor can 
easily be more difficult than that of a “complex” civil case.  But these difficulties do not 
affect the outcome in the sense that the prediction of these difficulties will not impact the 
parties’ settlement posture. 
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where the general area of law is the same—say insurance coverage or 
securities fraud—the past is only the roughest guide to the present.  We do 
know this about complex cases: there will be many issues, perhaps from 
problems with service in other states and nations, to jurisdiction and venue, 
preemption, choice of law, anti-SLAPP motions, demurrers, motions to 
strike, perhaps class certification issues, and often numerous hard fought 
discovery motions—and all that long before the merits are seriously 
addressed.19 The lawyers and the judge probably have not handled these 
issues before.  It may be that none of the decisive jury instructions is found 
in the forms, and the lawyers and judge are very likely to be required to 
read unfamiliar appellate opinions.  Indeed, it is likely that a series of 
significant legal questions are undecided so that the judge will find herself 
constantly estimating the appropriate rules.  This is another way of saying 
the law may be unstable, even where the type of issue is common.  For 
example, complex cases may involve arbitration agreements, anti-SLAPP 
motions, the reach and scope of a tort duty, or class certification issues.  
These are frequently seen, but the law is uncertain in all those areas.  
Preemption issues are notoriously difficult, not because the three types of 
preemption are new,20 but because precedent provides only the most 
general constraints.  In some cases both the court and the jury must issue 
decisions posing interesting timing and coordination problems.  Even in a 
relatively simple complex case, such as for insurance coverage with one 
insurer, it might be unclear whether the issue is the interpretation of the 
contract—and thus for the court to decide—or the determination of a fact—
for the jury to decide.21 
 
 19.  It is understood that early procedures such as anti-SLAPP motions, TROs, and 
preliminary injunctions will likely involve at least a preliminary estimate of the merits.  See 
CAL. CIV. PROC. § 425.16 (West 2015) (governing anti-SLAPP motions). 
 20.  See Town of Atherton v. Cal. High-Speed Rail Auth., 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 145, 159 
(Ct. App. 2014) (“The United States Supreme Court has recognized three types of 
preemption under the supremacy clause: express preemption, conflict preemption, and field 
preemption.” (quoting People v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243, 248 
(Ct. App. 2012)). 
 21.  See generally Entin v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 52, 56-57 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(explaining that a litigant’s jury trial right can turn on whether the court determines the 
matter is a declaratory relief action); Shopoff & Cavallo LLP v. Hyon, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268 
(Ct. App. 2008) (holding that regardless of the nature of the specific claims, the matter is 
still tried to the court, because it is an interpleader action); Oceanside 84, Ltd. v. Fid. Fed. 
Bank, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 487 (Ct. App. 1997) (finding that when a court uses extrinsic 
evidence used to a contract, the ultimate fact might require a jury, even if unnecessary in the 
case); Walton v. Walton, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 901 (Ct. App. 1995) (discussing a contract case 
that appears triable to a jury, but because specific performance is the requested remedy, the 
case is instead tried to the court).  Even when legal damages are one of the possible 
remedies—a usual indicia of a right to a jury—a jury right might not attach, such as in an 
action for accounting.  De Guere v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 454-
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Because multiple legal issues have a decisive impact, and some of 
those are novel, the relationship between the trial and appellate courts is 
different in complex civil cases than it is in, for example, simple criminal 
cases.  Some trial court determinations such as deciding anti-SLAPP 
motions, or granting a motion to stay or dismiss on grounds of inconvenient 
forum (or because service of summons was quashed22), issuing preliminary 
injunctions,23 and denial of class certification24 are subject to a right to 
appellate review, and the appellate courts are often asked to step in with a 
writ on other issues where early intervention may avoid wasted time down 
the road.  The review is almost always on an issue of law and so is de 
novo25 which in turn means the work done at the trial level is of little use to 
the reviewing court, and so in those cases, all the work is in effect being 
done twice.  Some of these appellate interventions come with a heavy 
price.  Appeals take about 18 months26 and writs anywhere from very little 
time, if the court summarily denies the petition, to probably about the same 
time as appeals.27  When (as is usual) an appellate proceeding is issue-
 
55 (Ct. App. 1997) (demonstrating that even when legal damages is a possible remedy—a 
usual indicia of a right to a jury—a jury right does not attach). 
 22.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 904.1(a)(3) (West 2015). 
 23.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 904.1(a)(6) (West 2015). 
 24.  In re Baycol Cases I & II., 248 P.3d 681 (Cal. 2011). 
 25.  The review is said to be “abuse of discretion” on class certification motions.  
Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 273 P.3d 513, 521 (Cal. 2012).  However, given the 
nature of the issues on appeal, the scope of review is frequently more stringent than this 
suggests.  See generally JON B. EISENBERG ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL 
APPEALS AND WRITS ¶ 8:225 (2015 ed. 2015) (discussing reversal of a class action 
certification or settlement).  For an interesting view on the relationship between federal trial 
and appellate courts in complex cases, and an argument that there is insufficient review, see 
Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure: Redefining 
Appellate Review for the Mass Tort Era 80, N.C. L. REV. 527 (2002) (explaining the 
historical reasons for the imbalance of power between trial and appellate courts, as well as 
their consequences for mass tort litigation). 
 26.  The range differs in the various California courts.  From time of filing to 
disposition, it varies from the third division of the Fourth District with an average of 393 
days to the Third District in Sacramento which has an average of 607 days.  The state 
median is 469 days.  But a given case can take much, much longer.  In the courts just cited, 
90% of the cases are disposed of, respectively, in 575 days, 973 days, and 742 days (state 
median).  To rephrase, if one is in Third District and the case is in the top 10% of time-
consuming cases, it will take over two and half years to process.  JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF 
CAL., Statewide Caseload Trends 1, 28 (2014),://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2014-
Court-Statistics-Report.pdf., archived at http://perma.cc/F826-GGKUhttp 
 27.  The time for writs is not published, and I have simply assumed that a fully briefed 
and argued writ proceeding, which results in a full opinion, may take about the same time as 
an appeal.  A retired state justice has suggested to me this is roughly right although in my 
experience the time period is often shorter for a writ.  In the First District, which is one of 
the faster appellate courts in the state, in 2013 on interlocutory writs, there were 22 written 
opinions and 310 matters disposed of without written opinion.  In 2012, there were 13 
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dispositive it will for that reason define the contours of pretrial preparation 
including discovery.  This makes it difficult, and sometimes impossible, to 
continue with the case in a coordinated fashion while the appellate 
proceedings are pending.28 
In most civil cases, not to speak of complex ones, there is a very wide 
variety of possible outcomes: compensatory damages can of course vary 
from zero29 to whatever it is the plaintiff seeks, and worse, if punitive or 
emotional distress damages may be available (whether they are in fact or 
not), or attorneys’ fees, the outcome is even less predictable.  Depending on 
the case, the possible outcomes for injunctive relief may be few, or many.  
There is no “market” for this case because it is very likely one of a kind; as 
I say, the lawyers [and the judge] have not seen it before.  But now I mean 
this here also in a stronger sense, because most complex litigators have a 
very limited trial experience.  Unlike their colleagues in the criminal courts, 
and with some exceptions, civil litigators rarely try cases.  It really is sui 
generis for them.  This poses its own series of problems, some of which I 
will allude to later. 
Finally, I note two further related contrasts between the simple 
criminal and a complex (or indeed any) civil one.  First, with rare 
exceptions, a criminal case will terminate based on the merits (and I am 
indeed assuming that a plea bargain is based on the merits, i.e. on the 
strength of the prosecutor’s case30).  The exceptions have to do with, e.g., 
the relatively rare suppression of evidence by the court, Brady violations, 
or perhaps a statute of limitations or speedy trial problem.  This is not 
necessarily so in civil cases where (unlike criminal cases) there is a risk 
that funds will not be available to take the case all the way through.  In 
short, the monetary cost of litigation is a serious factor in the life of a civil 
case in a way it is not in criminal cases.31 Once a criminal case  
 
written opinions and 280 disposed of without opinions.  Id. at 33.  That is, written opinions 
were provided in 2013 in about 0.07% of the cases, and in 2012 the figure was 0.04%. 
 28.  Obviously an appeal severely limits what a trial court can do, CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 916 (West 2015), but I mean something more here.  First, when an appeal involves 
some but not all parties, it is at least conceivable that a judge might opt to delay matters as 
to the parties not covered by the appeal so that a reversal will not require the wholesale 
duplication of effort.  And although they need not do so, trial judges may opt to delay 
pending a writ proceeding, and especially when the appellate panel has requested briefing 
(which shows serious interest in the issue). 
 29.  Actually, they vary down to below zero: plaintiffs may be stuck with costs and 
attorney’s fees of the other side.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 998, 1033.5 (West 2015). 
 30.  But see Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, THE N.Y. REVIEW OF 
BOOKS (November 2014), http://www.nybooks. com/articles/archives/2014/nov/20/why-
innocent-people-plead-guilty/, archived at http://perma.cc/M2NV-33VU (explaining why 
innocent people take plea bargains). 
 31.  To be sure, prosecutors have their priorities, and cannot take every case; and 
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commences, it would be bizarre if it were to resolve based on the fact that 
one party or the other was about to run out of funds.  But that possibility 
lurks in every civil case.  It is a potent source of uncertainty and creates a 
potent pressure point for settlement. 
This leads to a second contrast.  As noted just above, in civil cases, 
there is a threat to both sides; there is always a cost to a side even when the 
side is confident in victory.  In civil cases, this risk can be augmented by 
the cross complaint, which has the effect of multiplying the uncertainty of 
outcomes.  I do not mean just cross complaints against the plaintiff 
although that can be plenty destabilizing: the defendant may be able to 
bring in a plethora of other parties and, in so doing, vastly increase the 
stakes, the costs, and uncertainty.  This routinely happens in construction 
defect cases which might start out with a plaintiff homeowner suing the 
general contractor, who then in turn brings in all possible subcontractors as 
cross defendants.  Of course, these risks do not obtain in criminal trials.32 
The result is, as is intuitively obvious, that the result in complex civil 
cases is difficult to predict.  I have belabored the obvious because I wish to 
tease out and discuss the specific types of problems that make outcomes in 
complex civil cases difficult to predict, and in turn difficult to settle early 
(i.e. at an EIP). 
For the judge, a complex civil case is not just more work than a simple 
case, it is different work.  For example, judges handling a misdemeanor 
drug case are by and large trial judges and all their decisions are made in 
the context of trial.  Complex civil judges may go for years without a jury 
trial: their work is management and motions. 
V. ASPECTS OF COMPLEX CASES 
For convenience I have divided comments here into two parts, 
although some discussion under one might easily have been categorized 
under the other.  The first part looks at a few of the animating forces which 
may be found in any case and more so in complex cases.  As the subtitle 
suggests, I think of these not so much as good descriptions of a type of 
case—I discuss that in the second part—but rather specific mechanisms 
which create difficulties.  The second part roughly maps a sort of taxonomy 
of complex cases, calling out their aspects and the reasons why they are 
complex.  Each of these discussions aims to explain why judicial 
 
neither they nor defense counsel have the resources to undertake every possible pretrial 
investigation. 
 32.  Certainly there are very complicated criminal trials, especially with multiple 
defendants, gang allegations, and difficult issues of confession admissibility.  In the text, I 
am still contrasting the simple criminal case with the complex civil case. 
ARTICLE 1 (KARNOW) (DO NOT DELETE) 12/31/15  1:24 PM 
2015] COMPLEXITY IN LITIGATION 19 
 
intervention is helpful—or required. 
A. Catalysts, Inhibitors and Other Mechanisms 
1. Outliers & The Edge Problem 
All legal issues have edges (or, if we were writing in the 1960s, 
“penumbras”33), where the signal to noise ratio shifts from high to low.  
Especially during pretrial work such as discovery (but also at trial), not 
every minute is spent precisely on topic.  Lawyers understandably have 
concerns with impeachment, background and context.  We also see 
deliberate attempts to misdirect, an unsettled grip on [or straight-out 
misunderstanding of] issues, as well as the deep desire of most lawyers to 
account for each possibility and leave no stone unturned.  These 
investigations all lie at the “edge,” or border of core legal issues, and they 
threaten to confound and derail a case.  These are the black holes of 
discovery, and where juries go mad listening to what seems to be 
extraneous nattering at trial.  In motion practice, it is these issues which 
lead to the sometimes unauthorized filing of sur-replies and replies to sur-
replies, requests to impeach impeaching witnesses, notices of depositions to 
those who wrote book reviews of books on which experts rely.  Lawyers’ 
automatic, reflexive tendency in this direction is neatly summarized in the 
classic introduction to most document demands: “Produce any and all 
documents which refer, constitute, reflect or otherwise relate to [insert 
issue]. . .”  Every word in a contract could be deemed ambiguous and if so 
its every use by every person involved in the contracting process might 
be—if at some far distant remove—relevant.  Every witness has a history, 
and some events from those histories might relate to her credibility; every 
narrative of deceit, misconduct, malpractice or other offense has tentacles 
ranging back in time and outwards to other people and events—which 
might all be documented and ripe for exploration.  These are the edges of 
the core issues, the outlier issues. 
Every core issue has many such edges, and many issues may generate 
a very large number of edges which in turn may swamp consideration of 
the core issues.  Complex cases have many of these outliers,34 and as 
 
 33.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
 34.  See, e.g., Michelle J. White, Legal Complexity and Lawyers’ Benefit from 
Litigation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 381, 382 (1992), 
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/29878, archived at http://perma.cc/M7BG-
4QRA  (“Legal complexity is defined here in terms of the amount of information that must 
be collected and processed in order for lawyers to evaluate a case and litigation to proceed.  
For example, a statute that is vaguely worded is more complex than one that is clearly 
worded, since when the statute is vague, lawyers need to consult additional sources of 
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described below, parties in these cases have the means and motives to 
pursue them. 
2. Friction 
Friction is the cost of doing business: the transaction costs.  It is the 
reason there are no perpetual motion machines; it is the second law of 
thermodynamics.  In litigation, it is the cost of getting things done, whether 
it is the cost in time of picking up the phone for a meet and confer, the 
price of an expensive summary judgment motion, privilege logs with a 
thousand entries, or flying to Denver for a deposition.  Obviously friction 
goes up with complexity: it may take a minute to arrange a conference call 
with one lawyer, and weeks to get it done among twenty lawyers; and 
because counsel are expected to confer and coordinate on every discovery 
motion, hearing schedules and depositions, joint case management 
conferences, demurrers (motions to dismiss), mediations, and much else, 
this friction is significant.  Friction rises rapidly with the number of 
lawyers, parties and issues (see the Edge Problem).35 
Almost all the procedural rules in the rules of court and California’s 
Code of Civil Procedure, as well as local rules and individual judges’ 
guidelines, were originally designed to reduce friction.  They set defaults, 
sometimes inflexible defaults, in order to avoid having as it were to 
reinvent the wheel in every case.  It would be beyond exhausting if in each 
case everything from the number of lines per page and how to secure 
judicial notice, to the format and timing of motions had to be negotiated or 
argued and decided by the judge.  Some devices, like a separate statement 
of undisputed facts (or format for objections) in summary judgment 
motions, or a separate statement in discovery motions, are required because 
they make issues easier to decide.  Having rules and defaults allows the 
parties and judges to spend their time on substantive matters.36 
 
information for clarification.  Legal rules that involve additional tests are more complex, 
since each extra test requires that additional evidence be collected and evaluated”). 
 35.  As every lawyer knows, transaction costs rise rapidly in complex litigation also 
because discovery is very expensive, a function of the fact that documents, including 
massive amounts of electronic documents, may be sought by the parties.  This subject has 
been the subject of much writing, and I do not discuss it as a separate problem.  
Voluminous, expensive discovery does contribute to the impact of many of the aspects I 
break out for separate discussion below, such as money, the shock wave effect, phasing, and 
deep reach. 
 36.  However, some rules may be seen as creating transaction costs in the name of 
affording due process and safeguards, such that we have higher level of confidence in the 
result than we would otherwise.  At least in our legal world, such rules are not merely 
transaction costs, a sort of potentially avoidable friction which interferes with the substance 
of litigation; instead, they are basic to the process. 
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But every rule extracts its pound of flesh: effort is required to comply 
with page limits, forms and formats, and timing requirements.  Time and 
effort is also required to revamp issues in a case to fit into the molds of the 
law.  For example, a complex transaction must, to be the subject of suit, fit 
within the constraints of how a cause of action is defined.  Often the rules 
act as counters in a zero-sum game: they are imposed by the court to make 
the job of judges easier, but make the jobs of lawyers more expensive.  
Twenty years ago, the Superior Court in Los Angeles mandated blue 
backers: extra-long blue paper backing for each filing.  These made it 
simpler for some judges to locate a given filing, but created headaches for 
lawyers.  One north Bay Area county court required lawyers to appear in 
person to obtain a hearing date on demurrers: I asked a judge there why this 
has been done.  It was an enormously successful rule, she assured me.  
Why?  Because it reduced the incidence of demurrers to almost zero.  Now, 
that is friction with a vengeance.  In evaluating objections to deposition 
designations, I require lawyers to create a single document which reflects 
all designations, counter-designations and objections: this imposes a burden 
on them, in order to save myself the burden of combing through sometimes 
a dozen documents at the same time in a multi-party case to get a sense of 
the objections in context.  Roughly the same rationale applies to 
requirements for the format of jury instructions, the provision of copies of 
out-of-state cases, and so on and so forth. 
The rules and defaults are written with the standard case in mind, and 
some friction will always be imposed, but of course there are few of these 
ideal standard cases, and so there will always be unnecessary friction, and 
wise counsel and judges will try to ameliorate those costs.  Lawyers will 
ask for relief from the rules, often for the best of reasons.  But even those 
efforts are costly: seeking leave to file more pages than allowed, having 
noticed periods reduced, negotiating informal discovery and factual 
stipulations—all sensible moves—are not free.  Some approaches, such as 
bench trials as well as the use there of declarations and depositions in lieu 
of live direct testimony, may well reduce friction but always at a cost, for 
example, the loss of a jury, and the sustained live evaluations of significant 
witnesses.  With the second law of thermodynamics, there’s no such thing 
as a free lunch. 
3. Information Flow 
A case is series of events, each done presumably to inform the next.  
At the highest level of abstraction, the complaint and answer inform the 
scope of discovery, which informs the evidence to be had at trial, which 
sets the stage for appeals.  Theoretically, each stage cabins the next.  This 
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happens because, to be overly obvious, information flows from one phase 
to the next.  Breaks in this flow are bad, and the rapid flow of information 
is good—although as we will see with the shock wave effect discussed 
below, information may flow too fast to be useful. 
Cases assigned to judges for all purposes, including cases assigned to 
complex departments, benefit from—but sometimes are harmed by—
increased information flow from one point to the next in the life of the case.  
There are some ways in which information is carried forward regardless of 
whether a single judge is assigned to the case.  For example, doctrines of 
judicial estoppel,37 the use of formal stipulations, prior orders (of any 
judge) in the case,38 concessions made on the record and in pleadings (such 
as judicial admissions in complaints) are all sources of information which 
carry forward into subsequent phases.  Statements made in one brief or 
memorandum can be used against the author in later motion practice.  More 
informally, case management and other conferences in singly assigned 
cases generate information outside the written record, and while lawyers 
may not technically be bound by these discussions, they do create an 
overall sense of where the case is going and what parties are willing to do, 
from which it can be difficult to stray.  This helps constrain the case.  The 
use of court reporters, and case management orders summarizing events 
and positions taken by the parties, preserve the information. 
Because the judge’s memory is also a repository of information, it is 
beneficial to have a single judge assigned to all phases of the case.39  It is 
inefficient when a new judge is presiding to have lawyers re-educate a 
 
 37.  See e.g., Jackson v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 102 (Ct. App. 
1997). 
 38.  Some court orders are useful in this sense, and not others.  For example, a decision 
not to quash service of summons is not likely useful thereafter, but a decision on demurrer 
may inform a subsequent motion for judgment on the pleadings.  Some decisions are not 
strictly speaking determinative in a subsequent phase but they may be persuasive, and this is 
so especially when the same judge is presiding.  Thus an order in a discovery motion only 
resolves that dispute, but may have a strong influence on the resolution of the next discovery 
dispute (regardless of who brings it).  So too with a denial of summary judgment: such an 
order has no subsequent utility (it is not admissible at trial for example) but its reasoning 
may influence the subsequent choice of jury instructions and rulings on motions, for 
example: directed verdict, a new trial, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  Some 
rulings, such as a determination that a plaintiff has enough evidence to survive an anti-
SLAPP motion, may play a significant and perhaps decisive role in motions for summary 
judgment and adjudication, and motions for a preliminary injunction; and vice-versa. 
 39.  I provide a short explanation for those unfamiliar with the options for judge 
assignment.  Some counties (and, historically, most all California counties) have a master 
calendar approach by which cases are sent out for trial depending on which judge is ready 
on that day.  Earlier, the parties may have been sent to a variety of different judges, for 
example for settlements, writs, motions (perhaps different judges depending on the motion), 
and case management (such as might be under these circumstances).  
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judge on the facts, or re-persuade the judge on the law.40 
There are at least two adverse consequences of this information flow.  
First, the judge may evaluate a current dispute under the influence of future 
potential disputes and a present dispute in light of a past one.  A simple 
example is a late discovery dispute: the merits of allowing the discovery 
may be overtaken by the imminence of a trial date.  Parties may not ask for 
an early trial date if they think it might cut off some other procedure such 
as a forecast summary judgment motion or discovery.  A party’s desire for 
extensive discovery and the concomitant plea that there are myriad fact 
issues may come back to haunt the party at the time of summary judgment, 
when that party desires to argue that no fact issue remains in the case.  
Many lawyers believe a judge is more tempted to grant a summary 
judgment motion if she is the future trial judge than if she is not.  In each 
such event, the specific merits of the present motion or issue are evaluated 
in the context of future proceedings.  Some commentators have suggested 
that to enable their views on substantive issues such as qualified immunity 
for peace officers, judges may be influenced to not find constitutional 
violations;41 and they may be constrained in their interpretations of statutes 
such as the American Disabilities Act.42  And having issued preliminary 
relief (such as a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction), 
judges may have in effect steered themselves into granting future relief 
consistent with the old order, regardless of the new evidence adduced.43 
 
 40.  It is not, however, necessarily inefficient for the court.  While single assignment is 
routine in federal trial courts, it is not in state courts where some use master calendars to 
send cases off for trial as soon as a courtroom is empty.  This ensures the best use of 
courtroom for trials, whereas in single assignment cases, a courtroom may have no trials for 
extended periods of time.  This may be seen as a waste of the scare resource.  The optimal 
approach (from the court’s point of view) of course depends on the types of cases generally 
handled by the court, and where there are different types—and there always are—a 
combination of master calendar and single assignment judges is optimal.  That means that 
some cases will never be singly assigned. 
 41.  See Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical 
Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 670 (2009) (discussing the thought process of judges in 
qualified immunity cases).  Judges may modify their views on one element in order to avoid 
an unpleasant ruling on a different element.  One type of the avoidance canon, by which 
courts generate an interpretation of a statute in order to avoid constitutional issues, may be 
an example.  Cf. Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts: The 
Supreme Court’s Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1, 23-24 (1996) (explaining the use of the avoidance canon that judges use to avoid 
answering certain constitutional questions).  See generally Trevor W. Morrison, 
Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1216 (2006) 
(discussing the canon of constitutional avoidance). 
 42.  See Cheryl L. Anderson, Ideological Dissonance, Disability Backlash, and the 
ADA Amendments Act, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1267, 1297 (2009) (discussing judicial 
interpretations of the American Disabilities Act). 
 43. See Kevin J. Lynch, The Lock-in Effect of Preliminary Injunctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 
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Concomitantly, lawyers who foresee this free flow of information 
(such as where we have a singly assigned judge) may be hesitant to commit 
early in one context for fear of upsetting their position in an as-yet 
uncontemplated future context.  I recall a case in which at the first case 
management conference I asked the parties if they agreed that the key 
contract was unambiguous and that I need not look at extrinsic evidence.  
No one knew of any ambiguities, and so the lawyers agreed, on the record.  
Within twenty-four hours one side had frantically retracted the concession 
for fear that its future discovery would be limited, and that it might be 
unable to make arguments—as yet unformulated—on the interpretation of 
the contract.  This fear is deep-seated; whereas judges hope to secure early 
agreements to streamline a case, lawyers generally refuse until they know 
everything there is to know—that is, until it is too late to do anyone any 
good.  Attaining just the right information flow—enough to truly expedite 
the case, but not so much that the parties balk—is a key to case 
management. 
As we see in the next section, there is another danger to information 
flow. 
4. The Shock Wave Effect (telescoping information) 
Every new (and not so new) judge knows what it is like to drink from 
a fire hose.  The most difficult assignments are those with fast, high volume 
calendars: 30, perhaps 70 matters in a morning.44  We see this in some 
misdemeanor, drug, and family courts.  Those judges operate first with 
scripts, and later almost instinctively.  Heuristics—rules of thumb—and 
standard procedures guide their actions.  The slightest variation can cause 
chaos.  This is not because the judges are incapable of figuring out what to 
do with variations, but because there is no time to account for them.  
Decisions which spaced out over time present only a sort of linear 
difficulty become qualitatively far more difficult and sometimes impossible 
when they must be made in a very short amount of time.  There isn’t 
enough time to absorb the information from one event or moment to use it 
 
779, 806 (2014) (discussing the effect of giving a preliminary injunction in later litigation). 
 44.  The numbers are often much higher.  John R. Emshwiller et al., Justice Is Swift as 
Petty Crimes Clog Courts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2014, http:// www. wsj. com/articles/
justice-is-swift-as-petty-crimes-clog-courts-1417404782, archived at http://perma.cc/8FBQ-
FAUA (“In Florida, misdemeanor courts routinely disposed of cases in three minutes or 
less, usually with a guilty plea, according to a 2011 National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers study.  In Detroit, court statistics show, a district judge on an average day 
has over 100 misdemeanor cases on his or her docket—or one every four minutes.”); 
Bernice B. Donald, The Art of Judging, JUDGES’ J., 17 (1994) (“Trial judges in high-volume 
courts are often confronted with dockets containing 50 to 100 cases per day.”). 
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in the next. 
An analogy to shock waves illustrates this qualitative distinction.  
When an object moves faster through a medium (such as water or air) than 
the information about it can be transmitted, what was a gradual 
compression is instantaneously transformed into a shock wave of explosive 
force.  This has been termed a phase transition which for our purposes 
simply suggests a swift, powerful, and highly significant change in 
phenomenon—generated solely and literally by increasing the speed of 
information flow.45 
So it may be in litigation when there are a large number of issues to be 
resolved in finite time.  As suggested, this may happen in cases not 
traditionally thought of as complex.  It happens in busy law and motion 
courtrooms, where for example multiple motions for summary judgment 
are scheduled most days (on top of other motions).  It happens in routine 
trials: it may be literally infeasible to handle a large number of pretrial 
motions in limine just before the jury is about to be summoned, or last 
minute reviews of jury instructions, or ruling on objections to expert 
testimony during trial.46 
In the complex arena the shock wave may manifest when hundreds or 
thousands of mass tort cases are assigned to one judge.  More routinely a 
judge may have dozens of demurrers in a single case to hear one morning, 
or other proceedings with differing input from a large number of parties on 
a large number of issues.  In the context of a single motion, the shock wave 
effect may be seen as an example of a tight or close coupling problem.  
Some complex systems such as space craft and nuclear reactor systems 
have many subsystems which are all performing simultaneously and are 
closely coupled, that is, the impact of one subsystem on others is not 
buffered; accordingly failure may cascade through the systems without 
constraint.47 
 
 45.  See generally Shock Wave, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shock_wave, 
archived at https://perma.cc/6P6A-XRR7 (“The abruptness of change in the features of the 
medium, that characterize shock waves, can be viewed as a phase transition . . . .”).  See also 
G. E. Duvall et al., Phase transitions under shock-wave loading, 49 No. 3 REV. MODERN 
PHYSICS, 523 (1977) (“Shock phenomena most commonly experienced by an individual are 
the boom from supersonic aircraft, the crack of a rifle, and automobile pileups on crowded 
freeways.  The fact that the last-named event produces a shock wave suggests what is indeed 
true: that shock waves are very general and are, if not ubiquitous, at least pervasive.”). 
 46.  The objection will be that the testimony exceeds the scope of deposition testimony 
and is not within the scope of the expert’s expertise.  Thus the judge may be asked—perhaps 
at a brief sidebar conference—to compare (a) the subject matter of sometimes multiple 
volumes of testimony, (b) the scope of a formal disclosure or outline of proposed testimony 
and (c) the areas within which the expert is actually qualified to have opinions. 
 47.  See CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK 
TECHNOLOGIES (1999)(explaining the possible dangers of failure in high risk technologies ); 
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There are analogies in the legal system, in particular with complex 
motions such as those for class certification, summary judgment and anti-
SLAPP.  One error can cascade through the sequence of sub-issues, 
resulting in a failed motion, with resultant very high inefficiencies.  
Summary judgment motions are entirely notorious in this respect: small 
errors in form and format,48 errors in the title of papers,49 errors in timing 
service,50 and inaccurate handling of evidentiary objections can doom an 
otherwise meritorious proposal51 (or indeed result in granting motions that 
otherwise would never be granted52).  In these motions, a large number of 
 
CHARLES PERROW, THE NEXT CATASTROPHE: REDUCING OUR VULNERABILITIES TO 
NATURAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND TERRORIST DISASTERS 260-61, 264 (2007) (describing operating 
system vulnerabilities). 
 48.  CAL. R. CT. 3.1350(d) (stating separate statement must identify and be arranged by 
each cause of action).  Other formatting requirements are found at California Rules of Court 
3.1350(h).  Failures in properly arranging the separate statement may lead to denial of the 
motion.  See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(b)(1) (West 2015) (describing the 
supporting papers for a motion for summary judgment); Batarse v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union 
Local 1000, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 340, 350 (Ct. App. 2012) (“In Security Pacific, the plaintiff 
filed a motion for summary judgment; the defendant, represented by counsel, filed 
opposition that included a separate statement of disputed and undisputed facts. The trial 
court denied the motion without prejudice because it was not in proper form . . . .” (citing 
Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank v. Bradley, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220 (Ct. App. 1992))); Kojababian v. 
Genuine Home Loans, Inc., 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 288, 297 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the trial 
court was correct to deny the opportunity to cure failure to file statement of undisputed 
material facts). 
 49.  If the notice of motion seeks only summary judgment, a court cannot grant 
summary adjudication. Homestead Sav. v. Superior Court, 224 Cal. Rptr. 554, 559 (Ct. 
App. 1986); CAL. R. CT. 3.1110(a), 3.1350(b). 
 50.  Robinson v. Woods, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 241, 250 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding the motion 
cannot be granted if 75 days’ notice not provided, and court cannot provide relief); see also 
Urshan v. Musicians’ Credit Union, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that trial 
courts do not have the discretion to shorten the notice period); McMahon v. Superior Court, 
130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that trial courts do not have the authority to 
shorten the minimum notice period for summary judgment hearings). 
 51.  Objections must be made in a certain form.  CAL. R. CT. 3.1354.  If not, the 
objections may be overruled, and consequently evidence will come in and may thus either 
rebut a factual dispute where there ought to be one (and so have the motion granted), or 
successfully create a factual dispute where there ought not to be one (and so have the motion 
denied).  See Cole v. Town of Los Gatos, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722, 734 n.6 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(“[W]here a trial court is confronted on summary judgment with a large number of nebulous 
evidentiary objections, a fair sample of which appear to be meritless, the court can properly 
overrule . . . all of the objections on the ground that they constitute oppression of the 
opposing party and an imposition on the resources of the court.”). 
 52.  For example, if plaintiff fails to properly authenticate its evidence in opposition to 
the motion, or makes the wrong objection to the moving defendant’s motion, or fails to 
prepare a proper separate statement in opposition, the motion may be granted when it 
otherwise would not be.  See Hodjat v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 93 
(Ct. App. 2012) (holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider 
evidentiary objections not filed separately in compliance with Rules of Court). 
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papers interact with each other, and these papers are subject to a very wide 
spectrum of tests for adequacy.53  Generally, there is no time to fix things; 
all the papers are submitted at once and a single point of failure will be 
decisive.  Often, because these motions are made when the case is mature 
and close to trial, and because the notice period is ferociously long,54 there 
will not be a second chance. 
Similar problems are encountered in motions to certify a class where 
everything happens at once: the evidence is presented; it must be 
admissible, or objections must be correct; the class definition must cohere 
with liability theories; and ascertainability must be demonstrated.  The 
choice of liability theories will affect the adequacy of the class definition, 
and both will affect the decision of what evidence to submit.  These factors 
will likely determine whether the common issues predominate over 
individual issues, a central inquiry in this type of motion.  The balance here 
must be just right, for the case is probably over if the court denies the 
certification motion.  We even have a nice term for it: death knell.55 
Anti-SLAPP motions are infamously complex.  By these motions 
defendants at a very early stage of litigation seek to strike the complaint on 
the basis that the complaint is a covert weapon designed to inhibit 
defendants from exercising their constitutional rights to free speech and 
petitioning the government.  A classic example involves a chain store 
company suing the local neighborhood association on a trumped-up charge 
of defamation or interference with prospective contractual advantage 
because the association is demonstrating to stop the corporation’s plans to 
build a giant store in the residential area.56  Within the confines of a single 
motion, generally decided at once, and probably on a day when other 
motions are up for argument, the following issues may be presented: (i) 
 
 53.  As the notes above suggest, some papers are measured by formatting requirements.  
Others require a mastery of the law of evidence, while others must be titled correctly. 
 54.  Seventy-five days’ notice is required, which is usually extended to eighty days to 
account for mailed service.  Before the flood, these sorts of motions used to be filed with the 
same notice period as any other motion, about fifteen days.  See, e.g., Taylor v. Jones, 175 
Cal. Rptr. 678, 679 (Ct. App. 1981) (declining to modify the requisite notice period for a 
motion for summary judgment to less than fifteen days).  
 55.  The death knell doctrine allows the defeated class representative who brought the 
suit to appeal the certification denial, even though her individual case is still alive in the trial 
court.  Normally this would bar an appeal because appeals are allowed only after a complete 
and final judgment.  See Marenco v. DirecTV LLC, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587, 591-93 (Ct. App. 
2015) (defining the death knell doctrine and deciding that the case does not fall within the 
death knell doctrine’s procedural requirements).  
 56.  See, e.g., Mann v. Quality Old Time Serv., Inc., 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215, 221 (Ct. App. 
2004) (analyzing an anti-SLAPP motion in a defamation and trade libel case).  See generally 
THOMAS R. BURKE, ANTI-SLAPP LITIGATION (2015 ed. 2015) (discussing anti-SLAPP 
motions). 
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whether to allow some discovery; (ii) whether the complaint properly 
pleads a cause of action under standards similar to those used in 
demurrers;57 (iii) whether the claims implicate the defendant’s 
constitutional rights to speech or petitioning under one or more of four 
related tests; (iv) whether there are applicable exemptions within those 
tests; (v) whether the actions complained-of in the complaint plainly allege 
criminal conduct; (vi) under standards similar to those used in summary 
judgment motions, whether the plaintiff has enough evidence to support the 
claims, which may require a claim-by-claim analysis to determine if there 
is a match with evidence as well as rulings on objections to evidence; (vii) 
whether attorney fees are awardable under one or two different standards 
(depending on which side prevails on the underlying anti-SLAPP motion).58 
These motions are very difficult to brief because there are many different 
sorts of analyses at play, and the result on one may have a decisive effect 
on the next.  These motions are difficult to decide for similar reasons.  This 
presents a classic case of the shock wave effect. 
5. Money 
The injection of well-funded parties or very high stakes creates 
 
 57.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Parker, 50 P.3d 733, 739 (Cal. 2002) (evaluating whether 
plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim).  
 58.  Even this labored description of an anti-SLAPP motion hides such complexities as 
(1) handling mixed causes of action; see, e.g., GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs LLP, 162 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 831, 833-34 (Ct. App. 2013) (reversing an order granting a special motion to strike 
with respect to one cause of action and affirming the order in all other respects); Cho v. 
Chang, 161 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 851 (Ct. App. 2013) (“[T]he guiding principle in applying the 
anti-SLAPP statute to a mixed cause of action case is that ‘a plaintiff cannot frustrate the 
purposes of the SLAPP statute through a pleading tactic of combining allegations of 
protected and nonprotected activity under the label of one “cause of action.” (quoting Fox 
Searchlight Pictures, Inc., v. Palodino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 918 (Ct. App. 2001))); City of 
Colton v. Singletary, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 74, 89 (Ct. App. 2012) (“When a cross-complainant 
presents a mixed cause of action that involves protected and non-protected activities, as is 
the case here, the question presented is whether the gravamen of the cause of action targets 
protected activity.” (quoting Haight Ashbury Free Clinics v. Happening House Ventures, 
110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 129, 138-39 (Ct. App. 2010))); cf. Burrill v. Nair, 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332, 
349-51 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding that if a plaintiff can plead a probability of prevailing on 
any part of her claim, the cause of action will not be stricken); (2) determining the 
“gravamen” of a cause of action; see, e.g., Old Republic Constr. Program Grp. v. Boccardo 
Law Firm, Inc., 179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 129, 135 (Ct. App. 2014) (“The question whether a cause 
of action arises from specified conduct for purposes of the statute depends on ‘the principal 
thrust or gravamen of the plaintiff’s cause of action.’” (quoting Robles v. Chalilpoyil, 104 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 628 (Ct. App. 2010))); and (3) deciding what the commercial exception 
covers; see, e.g., Brill Media Co. v. TCW Grp., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 371, 383-85 (Ct. App. 
2005) (analyzing whether California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision 
(b)(1) applies to defendants’ alleged conduct).  
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complexity; more precisely, money triggers the potential for complexity in 
any case.  There are roughly four related ways in which money becomes a 
problem in this sense: via (1) attorneys’ fees clauses; (2) very wealthy 
parties; (3) substantial insurance defense funds, and (4) high money stakes. 
Cases where the victor may obtain attorney’s fees become 
increasingly difficult to settle as those investments go up,59 and in these 
cases we do not have the usual incentives to conserve resources.  Those 
incentives are also often missing in cases that involve very wealthy parties 
and parties with unsupervised defense expenditures pursuant to an 
insurance policy,60 who are frequently unreasonable in their assessment of 
risk and cost. 
This willingness to spend infects a case.  Cases where a lot of money 
is at stake are not necessarily more complex than smaller cases, but this is 
difficult for parties and lawyers to grasp.  I am frequently told that I should 
allow more time, discovery, procedures, pages in a brief, weeks of trial, or 
hours of argument because there is a lot of money at stake.  This becomes a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, a vicious cycle: high stakes convince parties to 
expect very high costs, so they secure the services of high cost attorneys, 
which causes costs to rise. 
The result is a variant of the lottery effect.  In lotteries, we are 
irrationally willing to give up money in return for an infinitesimally small 
chance of a very high reward.  Parties and lawyers assume the high stakes 
justify high spending on very low probability options.  Where spending 
$50,000 may be absurdly high in a low stakes case to ensure one has every 
last email from the other side, parties in a $20 million case will conclude 
otherwise.  The same reasoning leads a party to map and test out every 
issue which conceivably has any relationship to the merits—the Edge 
Problem.  A party may spend a lot of money on a low probability option 
because it may increase the odds of eventual success and slightly shift the 
 
 59.  See CURTIS KARNOW, Timing Settlement, supra note 15, at 6 (“We know from 
experience that the availability of attorney’s fees often blocks settlement late in the life of 
the case, especially when the fees expended outweigh the reasonable settlement of the case 
absent such fees.”). 
 60.  An insurer’s duty to defend may create incentives to throw huge sums of money 
into a case, in order to avoid or reduce the possibility of a judgment in excess of policy 
limits.  Insured parties wish to avoid judgments in excess of those limits as a matter of 
course.  Insurers have the same wish because they do not want to be accused of having acted 
unreasonably, breaching the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and consequently on 
the hook for a judgment in excess of policy limits.  See generally Gulf Ins. Co. v. TIG Ins. 
Co., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305, 312 (Ct. App. 2001) (discussing the elements of a cause of 
action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing); H. WALTER CROSKEY ET 
AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: INSURANCE LITIGATION ¶¶ 12:225-:341 (2015 ed. 2015) 
(discussing a bad faith action based on an insurer’s failure or refusal to settle a third party’s 
claims against the insured).   
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settlement envelope in its favor; in a high stakes case, a very small shift 
may be worth a lot of money.  The cost of a procedure or motion pales to 
relative insignificance in the light of very high stakes, at least as far as the 
parties are concerned. 
From the perspective of the courts, this is dysfunctional behavior.  
Wise case management and thoughtful settlement positions tend to focus 
on the probable outcome and probable worth of the case.61  We ask what 
the case is probably worth and what evidence is probably going to be 
useful.  When we ask how to best spend our time or resources, we 
implicitly tag the options with high and low costs and high and low utility 
and preferentially seek high utility and low cost. 
But when the stakes are very high or the parties have a vast amount to 
spend (the two do not always describe the same cases), the parties tend to 
concentrate on the outlier areas.  They focus on not only the middle of the 
bell curve where the most useful procedures likely reside, but also at the 
outliers: the tail ends of the probability bell curve, which involve making 
motions, doing discovery, and taking positions that will probably make no 
difference and can be read by the court (and juries) as frivolous. 
There are two related areas of quicksand here.  In the context of 
discovery motions, judges are told that under the rule of proportionality, the 
stakes should be considered when directing expenditures of resources to 
comply with discovery demands.62  We simply cannot have a $50,000 
demand for documents when the case is worth $10,000.  But the converse 
is not necessarily true: that we should have a $50,000 demand in a case 
worth $20 million. 
As suggested above, especially in cases involving potential recovery 
of attorney’s fees from the other side, but in any case in which very large 
amounts of money have been spent, settlement becomes increasing difficult 
as the case goes on.  Parties and lawyers are subject to what I call the Viet-
Nam Syndrome and what economists usually call the “sunk costs” fallacy.  
Having sunk innumerable dollars into the litigation, parties will not settle 
for some small fraction of that amount—even though past expenditures are 
usually irrelevant to the settlement decision, which should be based on the 
odds of securing a future return at trial.  If a plaintiff could win a maximum 
of $100 at trial, then she should settle for some reasonable fraction of that; 
it does not matter if she spent $50 or $5,000 to get to that point.  But in fact 
it does: irrational cognitive fallacies infect decision making all the time, 
 
 61.  See infra Section VIII (exploring judges’ tools for managing complex cases). 
 62.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) requires judges to limit discovery when “the discovery sought 
is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is 
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.”  
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and cases involving a lot of money make this more likely.63  The problem is 
more intractable when there is an attorneys’ fees clause because it is not 
entirely irrational to count past expenditures.  In those cases, the tail truly 
does end up wagging the dog: consideration of the fees often trumps an 
evaluation of the merits. 
6. The Unintended Impact of Complex Treatment 
In California, there are two courts that pick the cases they will hear: 
the Supreme Court, which generally chooses which cases to review, and the 
complex litigation courts, which pass on applications for complex 
treatment filed by one or more parties.  Presumably the parties seek 
complex treatment because they wish for wise management and the 
opportunity to channel their efforts, constrain costs, and have some control.  
However, designation of a case as “complex” may increase the costs and 
complexity of litigation, and it may vastly increase the time to judgment. 
As I will discuss below in Section VII, the complex litigation judge 
has many weapons in her arsenal.  Chief among them include the ability to 
pace and stagger such events as discovery and motions and bifurcate issues 
into a series of bench trials and other sorts of phasing.  These tools may 
solve one set of problems but create others.  These tools solve the shock 
wave problem and help the judge reach the right (i.e., considered) result 
when the crush of work may make serious evaluation of an issue difficult. 
On the other hand, complex designation may ensure that every 
possible issue, including outliers, will be treated.  Absent complex 
designation, the issues may not have been raised or may have been seen as 
moot or irrelevant.64  That designation may increase the time and money 
spent on litigation.  In non-complex cases, issues such as jury instructions 
and evidentiary rulings may never be raised because the case settles, a 
different determination (e.g. a summary judgment order) terminates or 
modifies the case, or as the case unfolds at trial, the issue is ignored by the 
lawyers or mooted by other events.  Since the vast majority of cases settle, 
issues that arguably matter only to trial may never be reached.  Trial has a 
wonderfully focusing effect on the experienced lawyer: the thirty-five 
affirmative defenses are unceremoniously thrown overboard; claims are 
pared down; of the fifty persons on the witness list, ten show up; problems 
with the admissibility of thousands of documents are forgotten in favor of 
 
 63.  See generally Andrew J. Wistrich et al., supra note 16, at 612-20 (discussing the 
“sunk-cost fallacy”). 
 64.  Thus appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with trial proceedings, short of an 
appeal.  Issues raised by writ petitions may never have to be considered at the end of the 
case. 
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the fifty items that the jury will actually review.65  Even potentially decisive 
issues such as statutes of limitations may be swept under the rug as the 
relative strength and power of other issues dominate the trial. 
Complex judges tend to peel out as many issues as they can as early as 
possible.  (I am guilty here: I have jocularly66 suggested to horrified 
lawyers that we have a jury instruction conference a week after the Answer 
is filed.)  But when all of the issues are handled before trial, sometimes 
long before trial, the focusing effect of trial is lost.  When judges manage a 
complex case for years before it gets to trial, each conceivable issue can be 
broken out for early, separate, exhaustive treatment.  This increases the 
odds of spending time and money on outlier issues, and it can turn a two 
year case into a five year case. 
Getting to trial as fast as one practically can is an important governor 
of discovery costs.  We do discovery to avoid “ambush” at trial and to 
ensure high confidence in the final result.  But discovery also redirects 
costs by shifting them from the trial to pretrial work.  This reduces trial 
time, which includes the high cost of a judge’s time67 to pretrial work.  
Discovery diminishes trial complexity at the cost of increasing pretrial 
complexity.  But without a trial—and especially in complex cases, we 
rarely have trials68—all the costs are incurred, but not all the benefits are 
gained. 
B. Case Types 
Here I outline five general types of complex cases.  These share some 
characteristics, and each may be animated by some of the mechanisms I 
have just outlined above.  But distinguishing them will be useful as we go 
over some of the means of control later in Section VII. 
1. Multi-step 
Some cases and issues in cases are seen as complex because the 
participants must traverse a long series of steps, factors, or tests.  When the 
steps must be handled in a short period of time, we run into a shock wave 
effect.  We can see this operate at a small scale with a hearsay objection, 
sometimes formulated and ruled on within a few seconds at trial.  The 
 
 65.  However, not all lawyers handling complex cases are accomplished trial lawyers.  
These lawyers may still hope to use 10,000 exhibits.  
 66.  That is, jocose only as a judge thinks it, which usually means: not funny at all. 
 67.  Judges’ time is a “high” cost in the sense that it is scarce and is often a bottleneck 
in the processing of cases. 
 68.  See supra text accompanying note 15. 
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purpose of the evidence must be ascertained, which first requires a good 
grip on the issues to be proved at trial; that is, materiality must be first 
treated.  Then the many types of exceptions to the hearsay rule are 
evaluated.  Similar analyses are made under California Evidence Code 
section 1101(a) regulating the admission of character evidence.69 
As described above some motions—typically those thought of as 
complex—have this multi-step aspect: anti-SLAPP, summary judgment 
and class certification.  While any judge can handle these motions, the 
nature of these motions is a reason to have judges familiar with the 
procedures do so: they know what can go wrong, what to look for, even 
when the lawyers do not. 
Some legal tests with multiple factors are sequential; anti-SLAPP, for 
all of its Rube Goldberg complexity, is an example.  One methodically 
plods through any requests for discovery, examines the complaint to 
determine if it is well-pled, reviews exemptions and exceptions, the 
criminal activity preclusion, the first prong, the second prong, considers fee 
requests, and so on.70 
More significantly for present purposes, other tests require the 
simultaneous balancing of multiple incommensurate factors each of which 
is more or less present across a spectrum: these tests could be termed 
complex, as opposed to merely complicated.  The humble discovery 
motion, often requiring the balancing of burden with relevancy, is a perfect 
example: these classic two factors are incommensurate, i.e. they are not on 
the same scale, yet judges are asked to balance them against each other.71 
So too with the balancing done for preliminary injunctions: we balance (i) 
the likelihood of prevailing (the merits) against (ii) the result of a separate 
 
 69.  See B. SIMONS, SIMONS CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE MANUAL § 6:1, at 470-72 (2015 ed. 
2015) (discussing California Evidence Code section 1101(a)). 
 70.  See generally, ROBERT I. WEIL ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL 
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL ¶ 7:500 (2015) (providing an overview of anti-SLAPP motions). 
 71.  While discovery fights are commonly thought of as involving two factors, there are 
more.  As I write elsewhere in this note, the stakes of the case are pertinent to the 
proportionality factor.  And what I have termed the relevancy issue actually hides two 
separate factors: the pertinence or materiality of the issue in the case and the utility or 
relevancy of the specific discovery at stake to that issue.  There is a further factor, usually 
hidden in the evaluation of burden: the availability of other means of discovery.  I 
summarize: if Alice wants a document from Bob, the burden analysis will involve (a) the 
stakes in the case (e.g., lots of money versus not very much), (b) where else the data on the 
document could be found (nowhere else, versus from a lot of different places including 
Alice’s own files, implicating an analysis of the burden on Alice to get the data from some 
other place), and (c) how much time and effort it will cost Bob to produce it.  The other 
factors are: what issue the document relates to (a core issue versus outlier), and how 
important the document is to that issue (it will help a little versus help a lot).  That is five 
factors.  Each is on a spectrum (from a little to a lot), and with exception of Alice’s and 
Bob’s burdens, each spectrum is entirely incommensurate with all the others. 
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balancing of respective harms to the parties.  And so too for the common 
balancing under California Evidence Code section 352: the prejudicial 
impact of the evidence versus its probative value.72  Other common tests, 
such as trademark infringement, require the evaluation of about eight 
incommensurate factors,73 and the test to determine if one is an employee 
or an independent contractor depends on evaluating one primary factor and 
seven secondary factors.74  Deciding attorneys’ fees for services to a minor 
or a person with a disability involves fourteen factors, some with subparts, 
and almost all of them incommensurate with each other.75  There are 
nineteen factors to consider as one decides whether to let cameras in a 
courtroom.76  Tests for alter ego liability,77 sentencing, and many others 
involve this multi-step, multi-factor process, often as part of a single 
analysis and almost always pitting incommensurate factors (many of which 
are more or less present, as across a spectrum) against each other. 
But we are not done.  There are different ways in which these factors 
interact, and the rules of interaction are not always obvious.  In some 
situations, all the factors are, as it were, in the soup: they all have an 
essential role.  Discovery motions and the balancing under California 
Evidence Code section 352 probably fall under this rubric.78  In other 
situations, any of the factors might be decisive.  For example, class action 
certification motions are doomed if any of the usual factors (e.g., 
 
 72.  CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 2015). 
 73.  See Winchester Mystery House, LLC v. Global Asylum, Inc., 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
412, 426 (Ct. App. 2012) (discussing the eight Polaroid factors (citing Polaroid Corp. v. 
Polaroid Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961)); 
see also In re E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding 
that the Du Pont factors are used in opposition proceedings within the Trademark Office 
when two marks are in apparent conflict, as opposed to the district court context where 
Polaroid is the typical citation). 
 74.  See S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 409 
(Cal. 1989) cited with approval in Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 327 P.3d 
165, 176 (Cal. 2014) (discussing the factors for an independent contractor); see also 17 
U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (stating that the factors—such as the key factors of (1) amount of 
original material used and (2) the impact on the market for the original item—are 
incommensurate.); cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994) 
(holding that in an action alleging copyright infringement, a court should weigh each of 
many factors on a “case-by-case” basis, and depending on the facts of the case, some factors 
may weigh more heavily than others). 
 75.  CAL. R. CT. 7.955. 
 76.  The last factor being: “(S) Any other factor the judge deems relevant.”  CAL. R. CT. 
1.150(e)(3). 
 77.  There are at least fourteen factors for alter ego liability “[a]mong” others “under 
the particular circumstances of each case,” and as the court noted, the “long list of factors is 
not exhaustive.” Greenspan v. LADT, LLC, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 118, 138-39 (Ct. App. 2010), 
(quoting Zoran Corp. v. Chen, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 597 (Ct. App. 2010)). 
 78.  CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 2015). 
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ascertainability, counsel competence, predominance of common issues, 
etc.) fails.79  In other contexts, there are many relevant factors but only a 
few are usually decisive, as in the tests for independent contractor status.80  
Sometimes the rhetoric of the tests suggests all factors ought to be 
considered, but this is false: one or two factors are in practice decisive and 
the rest are brusquely arranged to conform.81  Sometimes the factors are 
just a list of things to think about, any of which might have some, or a lot, 
of weight, but not necessarily.  Setting a trial date is like that.82  In other 
situations, the list of factors is actually a way of listing the aspects or 
characteristic of a legal notion: enough of them and the notion is manifest.  
For example, the Supreme Court has cited about eight factors involved in 
deciding whether one is an agent of another.83  For all their variety, these 
factors all harken back to a single guiding thread: they are different ways of 
thinking about control and direction; they are facets of the single factual 
predicate which in sum might, or might not, lead one to conclude that 
someone was an agent of another. 
This is not the place to complain too much about these tests;84 there 
 
 79.  See generally WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 3:2 
(5th ed. 2011) (discussing a prerequisite to class certification in some courts that the class is 
definite and ascertainable), 3:50-3:88 (discussing the adequacy of counsel requirement), 
3:18 (discussing the common issues requirement); ROBERT I. WEIL, supra note 70, ch. 14 
(2015) (discussing representative and class actions). 
 80.  See Judd J. Balmer, Civil Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. § 881 and the Eighth 
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 999, 1028 (1996) (discussing how 
the multifactor tests for permissible civil forfeitures generally comes down to a look at two 
factors). 
 81.  This is probably true in trademark infringement cases.  Barton Beebe, An Empirical 
Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1582 
(2006) (“[C]ourts typically declare that no single factor outcome is dispositive.  The data 
clearly contradict this assertion.”). 
 82.  CAL. R. CT. 3.729 (listing the twenty-five factors.  The twenty-fifth one reads: 
“(25) Any other factor that would significantly affect the determination of the appropriate 
date of trial.”). 
 83.  Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989) (“No one 
of these factors is determinative. . . . [T]he skill required; the source of the instrumentalities 
and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; 
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the 
extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the method of 
payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of 
the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision 
of employee benefits, and the tax treatment of the hired party.”). 
 84.  Others have done so in a wide variety of contexts.  See, e.g., Palmer v. Chicago, 
806 F.2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[A]s with so many multi-‘pronged’ legal tests it 
manages to be at once redundant, incomplete, and unclear.”); Benjamin L. Ellison, More 
Connection, Less Protection? Off-Campus Speech with on-Campus Impact, 85 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 809, 847 (2010) (articulating tests for First Amendment protection for off campus 
speech by students); Autumn Fox et al., An Eagle Soaring: The Jurisprudence Of Justice 
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may not be any other good way to capture the complexity of the real world 
problems that end up in court and at the same time provide some guidance 
for their resolution.  For now it is enough to note three things. 
First, there is an uncertain relationship among factors and the 
peculiarity of balancing incommensurate factors. 
Second, the balancing of factors by trial judges generally implies an 
abuse of discretion standard on appeal, and so some assurance that if the 
trial judge seemed to be thinking about them, the judge’s decision will be 
upheld.  But this expectation is upset when, despite the rhetoric, the trial 
and appellate courts do not share the same assumption about the way in 
which the factors are to be wielded.85 
Third, one will generally need a wide variety of facts before one can 
even begin to make the decision, and when the list of factors is open ended, 
one will not know when one has enough facts.  This is much more a 
problem for the parties and lawyers than it is for the judge: the judge is 
entitled simply to look at what has been served up, decide who has the 
burden of convincing her, and then see if the burden has been met (I set 
aside the other problems in weighing the factors).  The problem is that the 
lawyers will not know when to stop their investigation and accumulation of 
evidence. 
Some complex cases have this feature too, that is, they require the 
parties and court to move through a long series of steps.  The case begins 
with a series of demurrers, moves to discovery, then perhaps to a class 
certification motion, then fuller merits discovery, motions for summary 
judgment, and so on.  Cases may be more complicated: the parties may 
have early motions to quash service of summons, to change venue, for a 
 
Antonin Scalia, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 223 (1997) (discussion of Justice Scalia’s advocacy 
for clear rules); Matthew P. Harrington, After the Flood: Cleaning Up the Test for Admiralty 
Jurisdiction over Tort, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 40 (1995) (describing a test for admiralty 
jurisdiction); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1179 (1989) (discussing the totality of circumstances test).   
 85.  We have this issue with, for example, class certification decisions.  See EISENBERG 
ET AL., supra note 26 (“The law, however, does not require any particular level of detail in 
the trial court’s order.”) (quoting Dailey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 480, 
491 (Ct. App. 2013)). While evidentiary rulings are said to be subject to the deferential 
abuse of discretion standards, see Twenty-Nine Palms Enters. Corp. v. Bardos, 149 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 52, 62 (Ct. App. 2012), and rarely lead to reversal, Margaret A. Berger, see When, 
If Ever, Does Evidentiary Error Constitute Reversible Error?, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 893, 
894 (1992), when trial judges get the law wrong, the appellate courts say so, and may 
reverse, even when the issue is a balancing test, see, e.g., People v. Edwards, 193 Cal. Rptr. 
696, 744(Cal. Ct. App. 2015), and because many such rulings are in fact just the application 
of law. See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Tokio Marine & Nichido 
Fire Ins. Co., 185 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 303 (Ct. App. 2015)(applying the factors for class 
certification); Collins v. Navistar, Inc., 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 137, 160 (Ct. App. 2013) (using 
the factors in deciding on class certification). 
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temporary restraining order and then preliminary injunction, and so on.  
This is the usual reason complex cases are so designated.  Perhaps because 
of the money at stake or available, the number of motions brought makes 
these parties “frequent fliers”—the case will benefit from a smooth 
movement of information from one phase to the rest.  Jiggering with the 
various steps—taking them out of order, or constraining the time for 
each—might advance the case.  We will discuss these and other control 
mechanisms below in Section VII. 
2. Sprawling 
Another frequent reason for complex designation is that a case is 
related to a sometimes vast series of other cases, both locally and 
sometimes across the nation.  Multi-district court litigation (MDL) is the 
classic example.  Mass tort actions, such as those brought against makers of 
allegedly dangerous drugs, surgical implants, cars, and so on will be 
brought as separate actions—sometimes many thousands of separate 
actions—across the country, and will find themselves in both state and 
federal courts.  The federal system can collect all the federal cases before a 
single judge,86 and California has a means to send its cases, regardless of 
where filed in the state, to a single judge.87  The various states do not have a 
formal means of coordinating multi-state collections, and accordingly the 
coordination often is done though the federal MDL case.  Often, these 
cases are coordinated for pretrial purposes, and then are peeled off to 
separate courtrooms, perhaps back to the county of their origin, for trial.  
But still, many hundreds of cases may await trial in a single courthouse. 
There are many variants of this pattern of sprawling litigation.  
Sometimes, such as in antitrust, securities, and other fraud cases, there are 
parallel criminal investigations, and simply the existence or possibility of 
criminal investigations can stymie the civil litigation because principal 
defense actors are, for very good reason, likely to refuse to participate in 
discovery.  Major frauds can take years to resolve, with a concomitant 
impact on the civil side.  In asbestos cases, the same set of defendants—
sometimes in the hundreds—are named in a large number of cases, and 
while those cases may not be formally coordinated, the positions taken on 
discovery and, most importantly, settlement are inextricably intertwined; 
 
 86.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1407, 2112; see generally, JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT 
LITIGATION, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/rules-procedures (last visited Nov. 12, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/G9TK-MBE8 (articulating procedures for the United States 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation). 
 87.  See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 3.510-.516 (stating rules for state-wide coordination of 
complex cases). 
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suffice it here to note that settlement of one case is a function of settlement 
positions taken in a large number of other cases.88 In other situations, the 
same parties file in many different jurisdictions for some perceived local 
advantage—the classic race to the courthouse.  In one case I had, a party 
filed in one county; this was met with the other side’s filing in a second 
county for a declaration that the first party’s lawyers should be disqualified; 
cases were also filed in two other state counties, as well as in one federal 
court where remand proceedings were pending when I held my first case 
management conference.  We had, at one time, claims in three counties, 
some of the state claims on appeal (in two different appellate districts), and 
some in federal court.  And that was with a single plaintiff and single 
defendant. 
Defendants in, for example, mass tort actions are usually represented 
by a single coordinating firm (there will likely be local counsel in each 
court), but this may not be true of plaintiffs’ counsel; there may be many, 
many of them, each interested in pressing his own case, taking advantage 
of discovery and other events in other cases as they seek to reduce costs in 
his own case.  One should not make the mistake of concluding that 
therefore the management troubles just come from plaintiffs; they do not.  
A defendant in these situations is well placed to use events in one case to 
interfere with events in others: to use otherwise local features of one case to 
delay proceedings nation-wide.  Both plaintiffs and defendants have the 
ability to impose high costs on the other side. 
A central obstacle in these sorts of sprawling cases is the World War 
II convoy problem: the litigation moves at the speed of the slowest case.  
The center of gravity may be the federal MDL case because, as I have 
mentioned, it collects federal cases from around the United States and so 
deals with issues shared with all the state jurisdictions.  Discovery is often 
coordinated through the MDL.  Occasionally a decisive issue, such as 
federal preemption, might be handled there and have at least strong 
persuasive (if not decisive) impact on the state actions.  For all these 
reasons, any delays in the MDL (which may be the slow boat) ramify 
throughout the rest of the cases.  The agglutination of these cases may also 
suggest that they settle as a group, which too may delay the resolution of 
any given subset of cases. 
If not funneled through either an MDL or particular massed state 
proceedings, coordination of discovery in these cases can be difficult, and 
even with coordination there is often at least some discovery that needs to 
be done on a per case basis; for example, in mass tort cases, the specifics of 
exposure, medical history, and related background for each plaintiff. 
 
 88.  See infra p. 62 (alluding to the notion of the institutional litigant). 
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As suggested above, settlement of these cases can be tricky.  Parties 
are often unwilling to settle an isolated case on its own merits for at least 
two reasons.  First, the cost of pre-trial activity is not attributable to the one 
case but spreads out over many cases; settlement of the one case may make 
little difference to the defendants’ general exposure and will not materially 
reduce the plaintiffs’ pre-trial costs.  Second, as I have discussed 
elsewhere,89 the parties are “institutional litigants” and can never settle one 
case without considering the impact on the rest of the case inventory, and 
so each party tends to be more intransigent on a given case than it 
otherwise would.  This intransigence can be ameliorated when parties settle 
groups of cases at once, because this helps them conceal their weakness on 
any given case.  That is, group settlements tend to hide the fact that the 
plaintiffs and defendants placed a low value (from their respective 
perspectives) on what is for each a weak case.  This preserves their 
reputation as tough negotiators and so does not undermine future 
negotiations.  Thus, in asbestos litigation individual cases almost never 
settle, but groups of them do.  This poses serious problems for the 
administration of a given case because there is little a judge can do to move 
it towards settlement, and frequently nothing happens until the case is in 
trial, for it is only at that point that parties begin to expend time and effort 
on the case.90 
3. Multi-party 
Even within the context of a single case with many parties, 
coordination and settlement can be difficult to arrange, although usually not 
on the same scale as for a collection of distributed cases noted just above.  
In this category we find coverage actions with many potential insurers and 
tort claims against a long list of users, manufactures, and distributors 
(asbestos cases are an example of this). 
Moving these sorts of cases towards settlement can be complicated by 
the rules that apply to set-offs as a result of earlier settlements.  There are 
the usual pressures for early settlement such as savings on costs of 
litigation and, perhaps, taking advantage of an asymmetry of information 
that would be rectified as discovery progressed.  But there are also 
 
 89.  Curtis Karnow, Conflicts of Interest and Institutional Litigants, 32 J. LEGAL PROF. 
7 (2008).  
 90.  Especially in asbestos cases, the parties usually need to do very little to prepare an 
individual case for trial.  At least in my court, they usually file roughly the same motions in 
limine, the same oppositions; use the same experts, exhibits, demonstrations; and often are 
content to use the first few days of trial to offer deposition testimony (which costs little to 
present). 
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pressures to delay settlement.  Under Proposition 51 (embodied in Cal. Civ. 
Code section 1431.2), joint tortfeasors are all jointly and severally liable for 
economic damages such as medical bills and wage loss, but each is only 
liable for a percentage of non-economic damages (such as pain and 
suffering) corresponding to a defendant’s percentage of fault.91  A 
defendant may wish to delay settlement for a variety of the usual reasons, 
but also because in these multi-party cases its liability for economic 
damages—which defaults to 100%—will reduce as a function of set-offs by 
other defendants: all things equal, one wishes to be the last settling 
defendant because at that point the value of the case has been severely 
diminished.  This may have the effect of pushing many settlements to just 
before trial—or, as in many asbestos cases, just after trial has begun. 
A final word on class actions; they are commonly thought of as multi-
party cases and thus, complex.  But they are not, practically speaking, 
multi-party cases and they are not necessarily complex.  True, there is good 
value in having one judge assist with discovery and keeping the parties 
focused on an early certification determination, and it is exceedingly 
helpful if the judge is familiar with the usual class actions issues; for these 
reasons, these cases are usually assigned to judges in complex departments, 
which just perpetuates the assignment of those cases to those judges.  But, 
at least up to trial (and there is almost never a trial), they do not usually 
pose complex issue of manageability.  However, some class actions benefit 
from assignment to complex departments for other reasons—for example, 
because they are also deep reach cases. 
4. Deep Reach 
There are two core characteristics of what I term deep reach cases.  
First, the issue reaches deep into an organization, arguably involving many 
of its actions and perhaps personnel.  The equivalent is a contested divorce 
proceeding in a family law department: those cases may involve years of 
intimate details of almost every aspect of the family’s life.  The 
consequence for the civil litigation case is that the scope of permissible 
discovery may be very broad, and so it may be very difficult to distinguish 
between core and outlier issues.  The second characteristic is one I have 
mentioned before: a lot of money is at stake.  The two characteristics can 
 
 91.  See, e.g., AmeriGas Propane, LP v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 330, 
342 (Ct. App. 2014) (“Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount of non-economic 
damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant’s percentage of 
fault, and a separate judgment shall be rendered against that defendant for that amount” 
(quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1341.2 (West 2015))); Arena v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 
74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Ct. App. 1998) (analyzing the applicability of Proposition 51). 
ARTICLE 1 (KARNOW) (DO NOT DELETE) 12/31/15  1:24 PM 
2015] COMPLEXITY IN LITIGATION 41 
 
be a lethal combination, just as they are in a high stakes, well-funded 
divorce action.  Typical examples of deep reach cases are antitrust and 
some securities fraud cases.  Some cases involving valuable family trusts 
might also qualify, as do some cases under the state’s Unfair Competition 
Practices Act and unfair competition law,92 which attack the essential 
manner in which a company interacts with the consuming public.  
Defendants in these cases often consider them an attack on their core 
structure, almost an existential threat.  Discovery is typically one-way, 
against defendants, with costs by default borne by defendants, so there are 
few economic constraints on discovery (although just reviewing 
voluminous paper from defendants is a burden on plaintiffs). 
5. Multiple Path 
Some cases are characterized by multiple paths which may unfold 
together or separately, creating difficult loops and feedback processes.  
Some paths may moot others and so may be a waste of time depending on 
the outcome of some other path. 
Some cases are actually many cases, all of which may or may not 
proceed simultaneously.  For example, legal malpractice cases often are a 
“case within a case,” that is, a plaintiff has to prove both (i) the malpractice 
and (ii) that the matter the accused’s attorneys worked on (the underlying 
case) would have turned out better than it did.  Failure on either prong kills 
the case.  Some cases, such as construction defect matters, also involve 
insurance coverage issues, which may be in a related case or brought in the 
case itself.  The merits of these two may be intertwined: the existence of 
coverage may have a deep impact on how the construction case is 
defended—indeed, whether it is defended at all—and of course the merits 
of the construction case may be decisive on the scope of duties (especially 
indemnity) under the insurance policy. 
This loop/feedback pattern may be seen in phases of many cases and 
not just complex ones.  In general, a party may have a legal position which 
if valid authorizes discovery, but discovery may be needed to evaluate the 
validity.  For example, punitive damages may be sought for malicious or 
fraudulent conduct, but plaintiffs may need some discovery in order to 
adequately plead the malice or fraud.  We may ask whether contract 
interpretation requires extrinsic evidence, but we may need extrinsic 
evidence before we can answer the question.  In class actions, the first 
order of business is usually the certification motion, and much time and 
 
 92.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17002.  See generally Cel-Tech Commc’ns, 
Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527 (Cal. 1999) (discussing both statutes). 
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money can be saved if merits discovery is postponed until after certification 
because a denial of the motion may moot much of that merits discovery.93 
But many class actions settle and the parties usually need merits discovery 
in order to present the settlement to the court for approval.94 Percipient 
(fact) discovery is usually done before expert discovery because in the 
usual case experts rely on the facts.  But sometimes expert opinion makes it 
clear that more fact discovery is needed (i.e. to impeach or bolster the 
expert’s assumptions) and on occasion it is only the expert opinion which, 
if valid, justifies the cost of securing fact discovery.  For example, assume 
plaintiff alleges damages as loss of business opportunities.  Plaintiff may 
wish to obtain the confidential financial records of dozens of other 
companies which an expert says are similar to the plaintiff corporation to 
provide a basis for the calculation of damages.  If the expert’s theory is 
speculative or otherwise invalid, the discovery is a waste of time and 
money and risks revealing highly sensitive information to competitors, but 
the discovery may be needed in order to evaluate the theory.  To evaluate 
whether a settlement is in “good faith” so as to cut off other parties’ right to 
equitable contribution or indemnity,95 parties opposing the good faith 
motion may want discovery of what the settling parties know in order to 
show either collusion among them or that the settling parties have severely 
underestimated the value of the case.96 But one of the goals in such a 
motion is to avoid the cost of litigation including discovery.  Anti-SLAPP 
motions have two prongs: usually defendants bear the burden of showing 
the claims implicate first amendment activity, and then plaintiffs shoulder 
the burden of making a prima facie case on merits.  As noted above, this is 
often done within the confines of a single motion.  But some courts may 
stagger the treatment of the prongs,97 handling first either prong one98 or 
 
 93.  Also, a successful certification motion may result in modification of the class 
definition, or perhaps only certification of certain issues, which might then confine the 
scope of subsequent merits discovery. 
 94.  To grant final approval, the trial court must “independently [satisfy] itself that the 
consideration . . . received for the release of the class members’ claims is reasonable in light 
of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and the risks of the particular litigation.” 
Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 20, 31 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 95.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6; see Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 
698 P.2d 159, 166 (Cal. 1985) (providing factors that a court should consider when 
determining whether a settlement was made in good faith under § 877.6, such as whether it 
was made “within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor’s proportional share of 
comparative liability for the plaintiff’s injuries”). 
 96.  While the good faith of the settlement is based on what the parties know at the 
time, Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 78, 101 (Ct. App. 2011), not 
all parties may have the same knowledge. 
 97.  See, e.g., All One God Faith, Inc. v. Organic & Sustainable Indus. Standards, Inc., 
107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 861, 869-72 (Ct. App. 2010) (“bifurcating” the hearing such that the first 
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prong two,99 perhaps mooting the other prong. 
Because cases have multiple and (often) looped paths, each party may 
spend considerable energy jockeying for precedence, seeking to reach a 
decisive moment on its issues before the other side does so on its issues.  It 
is usually not wise to have counsel navigate these procedural options on 
their own: judicial direction is required. 
VI. CONTROLS 
The mechanisms and types of cases outlined above are aspects of 
complex litigation.  They are the symptoms of dysfunction in the sense 
noted in Section II above, that is, they suggest the need for judicial 
supervision.  Just as control structures are used to guide complex systems 
generally and help ensure they do not explode (sometimes literally) out of 
control, courts have developed controls and constraints to manage complex 
cases.  Some of these can be ordered by the judge, such as the bifurcation 
of an issue, staggered discovery, stays, and certain limits on discovery.  But 
most of these techniques require the cooperation of the lawyers, and that 
can be difficult to obtain, surprisingly so given the fact the lawyers asked 
for assignment to a complex department in the first place.  The reason is, 
however, probably straightforward: parties may sign up for efficiencies and 
controls in the abstract but not in the specifics, because in each instance a 
constraint is likely to be perceived as favoring one side or the other.  So 
parties will agree that early resolution is preferable to late resolution, but 
will object to a specific early trial date because it might not give them 
enough time to prepare; they will agree that expedited informal resolution 
of discovery disputes is best but not when imposing an onerous, time-
consuming process on the other side might teach the other side a thing or 
two.  Often, counsel desire complex treatment because the litigation is 
literally unmanageable without it, such as the coordination of mass tort 
 
prong was evaluated in the first part of the hearing). 
 98.  Prong two need not be addressed if defendants fail at prong one.  Malin v. Singer, 
159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292, 307 (Ct. App. 2013).  Parties can ask for discovery, but this will 
usually relate to prong two.  Thus, if the case can be resolved at prong one, no discovery 
may be needed.  Garment Workers Ctr. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 506, 509-10 (Ct. 
App. 2004).  The trial court in one case never reached the second prong—but the Court of 
Appeal did.  Schwarzburd v. Kensington Police Prot. & Cmty. Servs. Dist. Bd., 170 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 899, 905, 908 (Ct. App. 2014). 
 99. See, e.g.,  S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Flannery, 181 Cal. Rptr. 3d 436, 442-43 (Ct. App. 
2014); Hardin v. PDX, Inc., 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 403 (Ct. App. 2014)(utilizing only the 
second prong).  If there is a prima facie case under prong two, it does not matter if the prong 
one first amendment concerns are implicated—the motion will be denied.  S. Cal. Gas Co., 
181 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 442-43. 
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claims, but this may not signal counsel’s willingness to otherwise submit to 
judicial control.  Sometimes, lawyers have no idea why they signed up for 
complex treatment.100 (This note is for them.) 
A. Constraints 
First, we begin with a series of constraints.  Each of these techniques 
can be seen as a constraint, or providing direction, but with very different 
emphases.  The first set—stays and phasing—breaks the case apart into 
defined pieces, in effect uncoupling the parts.  The second—time limits—
makes it more likely the parties will use the time for the principal issues 
and reduces the odds of wasting time on outliers.  The third—sanctions—
identifies and presumably stops bad behavior; but there are also discovery 
sanctions, which have no moral opprobrium and are designed, again, just to 
reduce the odds of spending time on outliers. 
1. Stays & Phasing 
General stays are rare.  They are done because there is a pending 
appeal101 or because some other process will, or is likely to, entirely resolve 
the case.  For example, the court case might be stayed pending arbitration 
or because events in a related case—say, an MDL case—are likely to prove 
decisive because (1) settlement in the related case will include the local 
case or (2) discovery in the related case will generally take care of the 
discovery needs in the local case. 
More common are partial stays, designed to—in effect—phase or 
bifurcate events.  In a class action, a judge might allow discovery solely on 
certification issues and wait until certification has been granted to allow 
more general discovery on the merits.  Where an anti-SLAPP motion has 
been brought, the statute itself blocks all discovery except to the extent the 
judge believes discovery is needed to decide that motion.  Similarly, where 
a motion to quash service of summons on the basis that the court has no 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant has been made, the court may 
allow some discovery on the jurisdictional issues.  The court might also 
block discovery pending the resolution of demurrers to the complaint 
(motions to dismiss as they are called in federal court). 
 
 100.  I recall an initial case management conference when I asked the lawyers, as I 
usually do, what they had in mind for the progress of the case.  They told me they would 
like to do some percipient discovery, take a few expert depositions, file a summary 
judgment motion, and then have a jury trial.  They did not know what to say when I asked 
them why they were in a complex department. 
 101.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 916 (West 2015). 
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Without phasing, all issues are subject to simultaneous investigation, 
discovery and dispute; all issues are to be resolved towards the end of the 
case via motion for summary judgment, trial, or settlement.  Phasing selects 
an issue or two, permits investigation of those all with a view towards an 
early resolution of the issue.  That early resolution might actually resolve 
the case as a whole, such as when it deals with standing, statutes of 
limitations, the existence of damages, and so on, or it might nevertheless 
have such an impact on the parties that it helps settle the case.  For 
example, one might decide a statutory defense, the scope of duties, whether 
there is a basis for punitive damages, the retroactive application of a law, 
whether a witness can be compelled to testify over an assertion of privilege, 
whether extrinsic evidence will be heard, if attorney’s fees can be 
recovered, or otherwise the applicable law.  There are many fora for these 
determinations: an early jury instruction conference to decide the law, early 
motions in limine to decide the admissibility of evidence (such as whether 
an expert will be allowed to express an opinion—often a decisive issue), a 
bifurcated bench trial on any of these issues, as well as the usual (if more 
painful) mechanism of summary adjudication of issues.  Pending the 
resolution of the issue, the court might stop all other discovery and other 
efforts, or some of those. 
In these ways, phasing creates an early inflection point—the EIP I 
discussed in Section IV above.  Multiple phases create multiple EIPs.  
Another sort of phasing is so–called reverse bifurcation, by which one first 
decides if there are any damages at all, or the amount of them, without (as 
is usual) first treating the issues of liability.  Knowing the actual value of 
the case can further settlement: it is another EIP.102 
Phasing is also used to tailor the subsequent event, if not to avoid it.  
For example, one might phase a class certification motion.  Typically, 
when all class (and sometimes other) discovery is done, the parties brief the 
motion as usual: opening briefs, opposition, reply, and a hearing.  But one 
can also have the opening papers filed first without much discovery, take a 
pause to see what discovery, if any, is needed by defendants, do that, file 
the opposition, take a pause to see what discovery, if any, is needed by 
plaintiff’s counsel to respond to the opposition, file the reply, and then have 
the hearing.  The advantage is that discovery is only done if the other side, 
in its papers, made it pertinent.  So one does not frantically go about 
discovery because of positions one is afraid the other side might take, but 
only because the other side has in fact taken a position on some factual 
issue.  This artfully cabins the scope of relevant discovery and, not 
 
 102.  See generally Drury Stevenson, Reverse Bifurcation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 213 (2006) 
(explaining how reverse bifurcation encourages settlement). 
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incidentally, makes it almost impossible to object to the discovery 
demanded by the other side. 
Phasing decouples issues.  Instead of leaving the resolution of all 
uncertainties until the last moment, it progressively resolves one 
uncertainty after the next, without having to undertake the entire costs of 
litigation.  In this way, it also avoids the shock wave effect, probably 
allowing more time per issue, and so a greater likelihood of getting it right.  
It creates EIPs.  It may reduce the costs of litigation by removing issues 
from the case.  It can help avoid inadvertent failure: without phasing, the 
parties generally find out about gaps in their evidence and analysis only at 
trial, long after it is too late to do anything about it.  With phasing, 
problems are evident far earlier, and the parties at least have the chance to 
ask the judge for more time, or another shot.  Just as it is wise to take 
potentially dangerous complex systems (such as nuclear reactors and space 
ships) and decouple the sequence of events, make them more loosely 
interactive,103 so too there are real benefits in phasing complex litigation. 
There are, of course, disadvantages.  Most importantly, phasing may 
lengthen the time of the litigation.  Phasing class certification motions 
injects substantial delays between the opening briefs and the hearing 
(although if one counts the time needed for discovery for a non-phased 
motion it might be about the same).  Writs, and sometimes appeals, may be 
taken after a phase, and this may inject literally years of delay.  In busy trial 
courts, calendaring a series of bifurcated trials involving a lot of lawyers 
may create enormous delays, more so than setting a single, final trial.  A 
case I inherited from another judge has gone through three phased bench 
trials over nine years. 
Phasing usually blocks discovery on an issue not yet deemed ripe.  But 
it might be far more efficient to take on the entire discovery at once: most 
obviously, phasing such that witnesses are repeatedly deposed, or 
documents are repeatedly produced from the same repositories or 
custodians, may be grotesquely inefficient. 
Phasing segregates issues, and so the parties are unable to, in effect, 
borrow from one issue to reinforce a weakness in a different issue; this can 
strip away useful, and sometimes essential, context and background.  For 
example, it is difficult to segregate liability from the bases for punitive 
damages: the same acts are probably at issue.  In a construction defect case, 
the liability of a subcontractor, although in the abstract different from that 
of the general contractor, probably cannot be evaluated in isolation.  There 
is also the “halo effect,” whereby great strength on one issue—for example, 
 
 103.  See Perrow, NORMAL ACCIDENTS, supra note 47, at 88, 96-97 (noting the risks 
associated with complex, as opposed to linear, systems). 
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severe injury such as death in a car accident—might unconsciously 
influence a jury’s determination on fault.104  I do not suggest this is a valid 
reason to object to phasing, but it explains why lawyers might object. 
Finally, as discussed above,105 staggering or phasing creates costs by 
forcing attention onto issues which otherwise would be ignored. 
2. Time Limits 
Nothing, nothing controls a case better than setting a reasonable trial 
date as early as possible—and ensuring the date does not move.  This in 
effect sets time limits for all pretrial work, including discovery and 
motions, such as for summary judgment.  Only a credible trial date works 
this way.  To be credible, the judge must confer with the lawyers and 
understand what is really needed to get the case ready.  While setting a trial 
date early in the case is simple in a routine case, it is far more difficult in 
complex litigation because the parties cannot advise on how much time it 
will take to be prepared.  They don’t know.  The pendency of related cases 
(such as a MDL), the future need for discovery, and other uncertainties, 
which depend on the outcome of earlier phases or events, contribute to this 
uncertainty.  In one case, I was unable to set a firm trial date because the 
defendants did not know what discovery would be needed, which in turn 
was a function of the plaintiffs’ inability to fully specify all the bad acts 
they wished to pursue.  This was a function of the fact that the plaintiffs did 
not know all the acts the defendants had undertaken or what, if any, basis 
the defendants had had for undertaking those acts (a key issue which made 
the acts legitimate or not), which in turn required some preliminary 
discovery from the defendants. 
There is a trap here, though.  Just insisting on an early trial date might 
telescope pretrial work and so aggravate the shock wave effect.  A recent 
case settled only a few days before trial, and after enormous work on 
pretrial motions, jury instructions, witness preparation, and the like.  When 
I asked why the case has not settled earlier, the lawyers told me the trial 
 
 104.  I am using the term “halo effect” here far more broadly than is usual to suggest that 
views on one issue can irrationally affect one’s conclusions about an unrelated issue.  More 
properly and commonly, it describes people’s conclusions on, for example, a subject’s 
intelligence, competence, or moral status based just on how the subject looks.  See, e.g., 
Charles W. Murdock & Barry Sullivan, What Kahneman Means for Lawyers: Some 
Reflections on Thinking, Fast and Slow, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1377, 1391-92 (2013) 
(Describing the “halo effect” as “[t]he tendency to extrapolate from one or more positive (or 
negative) characteristics, and to like (or dislike) everything about a person.”); see also 
Curtis Karnow, Deciding, 55 THE BENCH 10 (Spring 2015) (noting that biases or 
impressions may impede rational decision making). 
 105.  See supra p. 47. 
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date had been set too close to the end of discovery, and the parties had not 
had the opportunity to evaluate their position before rushing headlong into 
trial preparation.  The lesson here is to consider shifting back in time the 
close of percipient and expert discovery—discussed next. 
One may set early dates for the close of percipient and expert 
discovery.  By default in the California courts, these are set by reference to 
the trial date, and expert discovery takes place shortly before trial.  In 
complex litigation this is often unwise: experts may be key, early expert 
discovery is likely to provide an EIP, the value of which is lost the closer to 
trial expert discovery takes place.  Also, trial preparation is extremely 
difficult, more so for complex litigation, and collapsing all expert discovery 
into the two months before trial often creates chaos.  In complex cases, the 
parties are more likely to have disagreements on expert discovery, asserting 
surprise and the need for modifications to the usual rules.  In some cases, 
the California default of simultaneous expert disclosure should be replaced 
by staggered expert discovery in order to ensure the right issues are 
confronted. 
Time allocations for trials should be fixed, or the parties should be 
told that such limits will be set, or refined, as trial approaches based among 
other things on the parties’ witness lists.  When the trial is set, a certain 
number of days will be set aside, and in busy courtrooms the dates after 
that trial will probably be filled with other cases.  In other words, when a 
trial is set, the length of the trial is also fixed, and the parties must be 
expressly told that their case will have to fit within that schedule.  The 
amount of time available for each side is always far, far less than the parties 
unconsciously think they will have.  Time estimates accompanying witness 
lists frequently would require a trial three or four times the number of days 
originally set aside.  But lawyers often have a very difficult time shifting 
from pretrial to trial thinking.  They have this problem because, by and 
large, they are not trial lawyers; they are pre-trial lawyers, and complex 
cases almost never go to trial.  The difference between trial and pretrial 
thinking is vast.  Pretrial has an expansive focus ranging out to every issue, 
including every edge issue and outlier that conceivably might be of any 
assistance in the case, limited solely by objections of the other party and 
the judge, and cost (and when there is a lot of money involved, not even 
that).  Pretrial work in complex cases routinely involves discovery that 
involves millions of documents, scores (or more) of witnesses, motions 
comprising hundreds of pages, many hundreds of written objections, and so 
on.  Entire rainforests are destroyed to feed the beast of pretrial work. 
Jury trials are different: juries can be expected to absorb a handful of 
exhibits, relatively few witness will be called and extreme attention is 
required to fit the case into the time allocated; core issues finally come 
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front and center, the outliers cast away.  If pretrial is the use of vast nets, 
trial is surgery with a scalpel.  The point is not to prescribe trial rules here, 
but that a focus on the needs of trial may help circumscribe and focus 
pretrial work.  Setting trial time allocations, noting a chess clock will be 
used to track that time,106 and frequent allusions to gathering what is needed 
for trial, assists this focus (it also reduces the odds of misery in those cases 
that do go to trial). 
3. Sanctions 
Sanctions inhibit bad behavior if the lawyers think the court will 
employ them.  The routine type of sanctions is the fee-shifting sanctions 
common in discovery motions.  The Legislature requires that these 
sanctions be imposed on the losing party (or if there is no meet and confer 
in advance of the motion) unless the losing party took a reasonable, even if 
ultimately unsuccessful, position.107  There are as well sanctions for 
discovery abuse, which is entirely different.  In these cases, a party has 
violated the rules such as by withholding documents when it said it had 
turned everything over.  Those sanctions can be fines, evidence preclusion, 
and if a party refuses to comply with a court order, terminating sanctions—
the other side is deemed to have won the suit.  And finally, there are 
sanctions generally for taking frivolous positions108 and violating rules.109 
These sanctions are meant to block time-wasting frivolous positions, 
but as with many weapons, their efficacy is best found in the threat and not 
the actual use.  Some judges may impose sanctions (if appropriate) early 
on, hoping to send a message that will smooth out the rest of the case, and 
fee-shifting discovery sanctions may have to be imposed under the 
statutory directive when a losing position has no substance.  But there are 
 
 106.  See, e.g., United States v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Ky. 1986) 
(discussing the benefits of setting time limits). 
 107.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. §§ 2030.300(d), 2031.320(b), 2032.260(b) (West 
2015) (providing for monetary sanctions relating to making or opposing discovery motions). 
 108.  See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 2015); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 
128.7 (West 2015) (describing bad faith pleadings). 
 109. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 177.5 (West 2015) (providing for violation of court 
order); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 575.2 (West 2015) (providing for sanctions for violating 
local rules); see also CAL. R. CT. 2.30 (sanctioning violations of rules of court).  There are 
other sorts of sanctions unique to certain motions or procedures. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 2033.420 (West 2015) (imposing sanctions after wrongful denial of requests for 
admission); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 473(b)–(c)(1) (West 2015) (sanctions on set aside of 
default); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437(c),(j) (West 2015) (same regarding default judgment 
or dismissal); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 396b(b) (West 2015) (sanctions  in favor of 
prevailing party on motionfor transfer of venue); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1209, 1218 
(West 2015) (providing for sanctions for contempt of court). 
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so many other ways judges have to send messages of disapproval that, 
generally speaking, sanctions are treated as an ultimate recourse. 
There are disadvantages to using sanctions as a routine means to 
control litigation.  First, they take time, that is, time away from the real 
work of the case.  They require additional briefing, and perhaps additional 
hearings.  This is satellite litigation, and it’s a distraction.  Second, issues 
which may look like outliers—a red flag signaling pointless litigation and 
perhaps a frivolous position—may turn out to be of real significance 
especially in complex litigation when commonly the significance of issues 
ripens as the case progresses.  Concomitantly, the threat of sanctions may 
cut off inquiries that may have led to something interesting.  Finally, some 
judges think an award of sanctions injures the environment of collaboration 
they seek to create, pushing the case back to the bad old model of 
aggressive, antagonistic combat.  By this reasoning, one award of sanctions 
inevitably generates a reciprocal demand for sanctions from the side that 
paid the first award; and then, there is no end to it. 
B. Focusing Devices 
In this category I briefly discuss a variety of options that help the 
judge and the parties focus their energies on what is truly at issue.  Some of 
these are somewhat artificial, such as page limits.  Others really do 
eliminate unnecessary disputes because they require adequate 
communications: a goal so often missed by counsel. 
• In cases with many parties, the court can appoint (or have the 
parties select) a liaison, lead, or coordinating counsel.  
Obviously this works best when the fundamental interests of 
the allied parties are the same, but liaison counsel can still 
help funnel debate for parties with somewhat diverse 
positions.  Papers filed by liaison counsel can state the areas 
of agreement and avoid repetition. 
• Formally (as a result of a motion), or informally at say a case 
management conference, the court can require the filing of 
what I think of as a “bill of particulars.”  These are 
specifications, the details of a claim (or defense) which while 
sufficiently unambiguous to pass muster on pleading rules and 
so avoid demurrer, nevertheless are so confusing or vague that 
it is difficult to know what discovery might be useful.  The 
same information can probably be secured through well-
crafted contention interrogatories, but my own view is that if I 
cannot manage a case because I do not understand the claims 
and oral discussion with counsel is not helpful, a written 
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specification can be of great assistance. 
• Educate the judge.  In cases that depend on a good 
understanding of a technology or unusual industry, it can be 
helpful to set aside some time early on in the case to educate 
the judge.  Perhaps experts will be present.  It will likely be 
off the record to provide maximum flexibility to the parties 
and not have them fear some slip early on in the case will 
come back to haunt them.  Such a hearing will not only help 
the judge make better informed decisions, but it may also 
obviate the natural and sometimes unconscious desire of 
lawyers to file motions, such as preliminary injunctions and 
summary judgment motions, to “educate” the judge and prime 
him or her to be receptive to their later positions on the merits.  
And not incidentally, these events compel the parties to focus 
on the specifically relevant aspects of the technology or 
industry, including requisite experts that are really likely to be 
important to the case. 
• Limit motions.  Nothing focuses the mind as much as page or 
word limits.  The phase attributed to many, “I have made this 
longer than usual because I have not had time to make it 
shorter,” reflects the discipline needed to make writing tight 
and to the point (I have generally regretted granting 
permission for oversized briefs).  Some federal judges bar 
motions such as discovery motions without prior permission, 
and some courts have limits on the number of motions in 
limine that can be filed. 
• Meet and confer requirements.  These are widely seen as 
effective, and indeed the requirement is written into 
California’s discovery code.  It reflects the sense that many 
disputes are misunderstandings, and my “one-shot” discovery 
procedure (discussed just below), which forces the parties to 
further meet and confer, frequently reduces the scope of 
disputes (the informal conferences I discuss below also are 
premised on this).  Some judges insist, or strongly 
recommend, parties confer on demurrers so that the plaintiff 
can fix the fixable problems, and when the complaint is finally 
challenged, it is likely the best complaint there can be, 
avoiding the all-to-frequent result of repeatedly sustaining 
demurrers with leave to amend.110  Parties may also be asked 
 
 110.  Law effective January 1, 2016 mandates meet-and-confer on demurrers in 
California.  S. 383, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).  
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to confer on areas for expert disclosure and other discovery, 
such as agreeing to limits on depositions and presumptive 
limits on the number of interrogatories.  More generally, there 
is a significant premium in complex cases on getting past the 
cartoon image of the contentious lawyer.  Much of the work 
done in complex courts is procedural, and there, at least, as 
the parties and the judge find their way through sometimes 
unfamiliar territory, there is a need to act cooperatively, 
leaving the fights to the substance of the dispute.111 
• Discovery.  Because so much of what the parties do is 
discovery, I use this rubric to discuss a variety of focusing 
devices. 
First, for reasons I have alluded to above, early close of discovery will 
limit the opportunities for peripheral and relatively useless demands. 
Second, the parties may agree or the court may order limits on the 
number of depositions, interrogatories, and so on.  This can be effective but 
it can also drive up costs if the parties need to come into court to get relief 
from the limits when the unexpected happens. 
Third, I encourage the use of the “one-shot” procedure, which replaces 
the cumbersome, expensive formal discovery motion contemplated by state 
law, with its classic tripartite briefing (opening, opposition and reply 
papers), separate statements of facts, notice of motion, and (often) a long 
series of attachments.  The formal motion usually has the same arguments  
repeated ad nauseam in the separate statement, in every single interrogatory 
or document demand at issue (which could number in the dozens or 
hundreds even when it is exactly the same argument), and then again in the 
accompanying memorandum of points and authorities.  The opposition then 
does the same thing.  In a one-shot, the parties pass one document back and 
forth, inserting their position on the dispute——but only once.  They 
continue to exchange the document among themselves until they have 
satisfactorily responded to the other’s points, just as a majority opinion and 
dissent will revise their drafts until each is satisfied it has addressed what it 
desires of the other side’s stance.  The very act of passing the one-shot draft 
between the parties is a “meet and confer” and many issues may drop out.  
When I get the submission, I read each side’s position——once and only 
on what is in dispute.  I can usually get an order out resolving the matter 
within a few days. 
Fourth, courts should use cost-shifting to help resolve discovery 
battles over the burden of production when the value of the discovery is 
 
 111.  See generally Jay Tidmarsh, Civil Procedure: The Last Ten Years, 46 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 503, 505 (1996) (discussing a departure from adversarial rules for complex cases). 
ARTICLE 1 (KARNOW) (DO NOT DELETE) 12/31/15  1:24 PM 
2015] COMPLEXITY IN LITIGATION 53 
 
marginal.  That is, while the default rule is that producing parties are 
responsible for the costs of production, judges should consider transferring 
the burden to the demanding party.112 For example, cost shifting may be 
proper when a party requests to have electronically stored information 
translated into a reasonably useable format.113  There may be difficult 
questions of affordability, and courts of course may hesitate to shift the 
burden when the practical effect would be to deny the discovery; but again 
the issue will generally be considered in the context of discovery of 
marginal utility. 
Fifth, judges can encourage a series of informal procedures; the one-
shot is an example (although the submission and order are filed and so 
reviewable on appeal).  Other informal procedures include telephone 
rulings on objections (specifically, instructions not to answer questions) 
during depositions——thereby avoiding costly motions and possibly 
renewed depositions——and informal off the record discovery conferences 
where practical issues can be hashed out and misunderstandings can be 
resolved. 
Sixth, expedited discovery devices are especially useful when many 
parties provide similar information.  For example, in many mass tort cases, 
all plaintiffs fill out a questionnaire on the facts of their exposure to the 
alleged toxin, medical history, names of treating doctors, drugs taken, 
prognosis, and so on, without the necessity of formal demands and 
responses. 
 
 112.  Philip J. Favro et al., New Utah Rule 26: A Blueprint for Proportionality Under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 933, 958 (2012) (“[C]ost-shifting 
is imposed for disproportionate ESI discovery, particularly for over-discovery of email.  
Given the high costs associated with the production of email and the infrequent use of such 
evidence at trial, the Order places sweeping restrictions on its discovery.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 113.  See OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 478 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“A 
responding party should not be required to pay for the production of inaccessible electronic 
data if the cost of such production is significantly disproportionate to the value of the case, 
i.e. disproportionately expensive discovery warrants cost-shifting.” (citing Zubulake v. UBS 
Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2003))); Toshiba Am. Elec. Components, 
Inc. v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532, 541(Ct. App. 2004) (“By enacting the cost-
shifting clause of section 2031(g)(1) our Legislature has identified the expense of translating 
data compilations into usable form as one that, in the public’s interest, should be placed 
upon the demanding party.”)  The classic statement is from Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 
217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“A court should consider cost-shifting only when 
electronic data is relatively inaccessible, such as in backup tapes.”) (emphasis in original).  
Since, cases have used a variety of criteria to decide when to impose cost shifting.  See 
generally Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 553 (W.D. Tenn. 
2003) (adopting an eight factor balancing test to determine whether cost shifting is undue.); 
Amy Longo et al., Current Trends In Electronic Discovery in TRIAL EVIDENCE IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS: PROBLEM AND SOLUTIONS (2005) (collecting cases on cost shifting). 
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C. Speedier and Simpler Procedures 
I collect here devices and procedures many of which could as easily 
be thought of as focusing mechanisms, because a device that simplifies 
generally helps focus the judge and the lawyers on the important issues. 
The simplest approach is to do nothing at all.  When the parties are 
engaged in a different forum and the heavy lifting of discovery and 
resolution of key issues will be conducted there, the best approach may be 
to stay the local proceedings, as long as events in the other forum seem to 
be moving at a reasonable speed. 
But otherwise, speed is key. 
Complex litigation is notoriously slow.  Each of the many moving 
parts——the large number of parties and lawyers, issues, related cases, and 
documents——tend to turn the case into a quivering gelatinous mass.  To 
be sure, complex litigation moves, but not in any particular direction.  
Many lawyers are cautious and do not wish to proceed until they are 
satisfied they have every possible contingency covered and every piece of 
information they may need to prevail.  Frequently the other side will object 
to moving on the very same grounds, i.e., until the other side has done so.  
These self-inhibiting loops are manifest at the most mundane level.  For 
example, Alice might ask Bob for the evidence that supports Bob’s 
position.  Bob answers that he cannot do so until he sees the evidence he 
has demanded from Alice.  Or, after the discovery deadline, Bob makes a 
motion for summary judgment (which might end the case), and Alice 
objects that she needs more discovery to respond.114  Bob argues she should 
have secured the evidence before, and Alice retorts she did not know what 
would be at issue until she saw Bob’s motion.  This stand-off either 
threatens the previously firm trial date or destroys Bob’s right to have his 
motion heard——likely delaying the case. 
Delay is the default in most litigation, and most especially in complex 
litigation.  Thus, one of the most important things a judge can do, from the 
first case management conference on, is to act very rapidly while allowing 
the parties a fair chance to be heard.  This sets expectations by example.  
The one-shot procedure discussed above carries this out.  For the same 
reason, judges should issue orders as fast as practicable and have the parties 
rapidly complete their meet-and-confer on discovery disputes, sending the 
message that interminable exchange of letters and emails to prove good 
faith meetings is not necessary; as soon as the parties have conferred on all 
issues, the motion (or other procedure) should be instigated.  By the same 
token, judges should be wary of extended briefing schedules stipulated to 
 
 114.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(h) (West 2015). 
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by the parties unless there are very good reasons for those. 
Summary judgment can be difficult for reasons to which I have 
alluded.  The procedure has many parts and each has to go just right to 
allow the judge to reach the merits of the motion.  Any dispute on a 
material fact is likely to torpedo the motion.  The procedure is also liable to 
severe abuse: parties sometimes file many hundreds of (or more) 
objections.115  The parties may be better served with a bifurcated bench trial 
at which the judge can rule on disputed facts if it turns out that there is such 
a dispute.  Bench trials can be expedited with the use of depositions and 
declarations on direct,116 allowing a party to cross-examine any witness live 
in court.  Another restriction on state court summary adjudication practice 
is that the motion must dispose of an entire cause of action, type of 
damages, or duty; but frequently there is some key fact or legal dispute the 
resolution of which would rapidly advance the case——perhaps to 
settlement——but does not fit nicely into these permitted categories of 
motions.  Again, a bifurcated bench trial——which may take a matter of 
hours or a day——can be arranged to resolve these issues.117  Bench trials 
are so important in complex litigation that I discuss them separately below. 
Whether for jury or bench trials, the parties should be encouraged to 
make stipulations and have the trial focus solely on the core disputes.  
Thus, the parties should agree on the exhibits to be introduced, or at least 
their authenticity.  Summaries of voluminous exhibits should be stipulated 
to, and at least with juries, those summaries should be used at trial instead 
of the underlying documents. 
 
 115.  In Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296 (Ct. App. 2009), 764 
objections were made over 350 pages.  The judge was confronted with 3000 pages of 
materials for this one motion.  See also Cole v. Town of Los Gatos, 140 Cal. Rptr.3d 722, 
781 n.6 (Ct. App. 2012) (“[W]here a trial court is confronted on summary judgment with a 
large number of nebulous evidentiary objections, a fair sample of which appear to be 
meritless, the court can properly overrule . . . all of the objections on the ground that they 
constitute oppression of the opposing party and an imposition on the resources of the 
court.”) (emphasis in original).  Remarkably, parties have a statutory right to bypass written 
objections and at the hearing—after the judge has read everything and likely has a tentative 
view of the merits—rise in court and make all the objections they want orally.  CAL. CIV. 
PROC. CODE §§ 437c(b)(5), 437c(d); CAL. R. CT. 3.1352(2).  However, lawyers rarely take 
this measure.  In an amendment to California’s controlling statute CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 437c, effective January 1, 2016, judges will only be required to rule on objections material 
to the motion. 
 116.  Where more than e.g. 250 testimony pages are submitted, a summary (a couple of 
pages, maximum) should also be provided. 
 117.  California experimented with what was designated CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 437c(s), subject to a sunset provision effective January 2015.  This permitted the parties 
and the court to agree to resolve any issue via the summary judgment/adjudication 
procedures.  The statute has been resurrected as § 437c(t) effective January 2016.The parties 
can secure similar benefits through a bifurcated bench trial.  
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Judges may use case management conferences and informal off-the-
record conferences to resolve a host of disagreements on a highly expedited 
basis.  Some issues truly need formal briefing, but without court 
intervention, all issues will be formally briefed, using up to a month to do 
what could be done in five minutes at a conference.  Such issues as 
discovery sequencing and associated stays, protective orders, perhaps 
misjoinder, and the general scope of discovery, may be treated this way, 
assuming no party seriously objects.  An informal conference can be 
especially useful where discovery disputes do not raise a substantial legal 
issue (such as privilege or privacy) but rather practical problems about 
timing and burden. 
In the spirit of encouraging the model of cooperation over the old 
forms of combat among lawyers, courts are suggesting and sometimes 
requiring parties to confer, or meet with the judge, in pre-motion 
conferences.118  There, the parties might agree on abridging lengthy notice 
periods for motions; determine whether, in advance of filing a summary 
judgment motion, any discovery issues remain (and avoid California Code 
of Civil Procedure section 437c(h) problems); seek clarity on decisive legal 
issues; and agree to facts and the admissibility of evidence.  My earlier 
suggestion of conferences in advance of demurrers has a similar rationale. 
Traditionally, a series of critical events takes place just before trial.  
Generally, there is a reason for this: the parties do not have information 
they need to engage earlier.  But sometimes they do; the speedier, earlier 
attention to these issues may create EIPs and——if the trial is to go 
forward——helps the court and parties prepare with less uncertainty, which 
in turn helps avoid the shock wave effect.  These critical events are: jury 
instructions, expert admissibility, and other important evidentiary rulings.  
In a simple civil case, these events may be treated the day before the jury is 
picked.  In more complex cases, these events can be handled months in 
advance of trial.  An early jury instruction conference is a splendid way for 
 
 118.  “We also encourage judges to hold premotion conferences before summary-
judgment motions are filed and fully briefed.  Here, the question is less one of whether any 
motion will be filed but of the scope of what gets filed and briefed.  We and others have 
noted elsewhere that summary-judgment motions are routinely over-briefed, often by both 
the moving and responding parties.  All too often they are ‘kitchen sink’ affairs that address 
every claim and defense, raise every possible issue, and set forth page after page of fact 
assertions on even the tiniest details, all of which then requires volumes of ‘supporting’ 
exhibits.  And yet in most cases, the motion will turn on a fraction of that content.  So why 
is it all there? Uncertainty and its cousin, anxiety.  The fear of being second-guessed 
(colloquially known as ‘CYA’) looms large here.  Absent any guidance from the judge, the 
parties cannot know in advance what will matter.  The only safe strategy is to hit every 
conceivable target with all of the ammunition available.” Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. 
Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke: Where Do We Stand on Calibrating the Pretrial 
Process?, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 643, 668 (2014) (footnotes omitted). 
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the judge to indicate her thoughts on key legal issues, including some of 
which may require substantial briefing on such issues as choice of law or 
the construction of a new statute.  An early conference may surface a 
discussion on whether an issue is truly for the jury or the court.  The 
lawyer’s choice of trial strategy may depend on these views from the court.  
Early ruling on whether an expert can provide a certain opinion may in 
effect decide the case and result in an early settlement. 
Many judges have standing orders, guidelines, or the equivalent.  I 
do.119  Their function is to clear the underbrush and avoid debate on 
incidental procedural issues.  As with indications that certain motions in 
limine are usually granted (such as those barring mention of settlement 
discussions, bifurcation of punitive damages, and so on), these guidelines 
act as default decisions, rapidly disposing of common procedural problems.  
They also set a tone, form expectations favoring quick informal resolutions, 
and offer options for reaching such resolutions.  This avoids friction. 
However, there is a danger: in some cases not susceptible to the defaults, 
time and money is spent to avoid them.  Lawyers may need an additional 
hearing or make separate arguments to show that their situation is not 
contemplated by these defaults; and that too is friction. 
D. Early Trial types 
Parties need not wait for the usual trial of all issues at the end of the 
usual pursuit of discovery and the usual panoply of pretrial motions.  Three 
alternatives are worth mentioning: bifurcated bench trials, bellwether cases, 
and expedited jury trials.  The first is the subject of separate discussion 
below, Section F. 
The second approach is a bellwether case.120  This is used generally in 
mass tort actions.  One case, or a few cases, are picked for trial and the 
results are used to guide settlement of the rest of the cases.  Of course the 
bellwether cases must be representative of the rest of the cases.  In some 
caseloads, a case or two may obviously be representative because there are 
no strongly disparate fact patterns.  In other caseloads, the facts are widely 
divergent——some cases are patently very good for one side or the other.  
It is simple to select a case from the first type of caseload.  As to the 
 
 119.  User’s Manual for Department 304 (July 2015) (on file with author), 
http://www.sfsuperiorcourt.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Fireside%20chat%20July%202015.pd
f,  archived at http://perma.cc/KEL7-8CH4 
 120.  Loren H. Brown et al., Bellwether Trial Selection in Multi-District Litigation: 
Empirical Evidence in Favor of Random Selection, 47 AKRON L. REV. 663, 665 (2014); 
Zachary B. Savage, Scaling Up: Implementing Issue Preclusion in Mass Tort Litigation 
Through Bellwether Trials, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 439, 442 (2013).  
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second, typically the parties agree on one of a variety of mechanisms: try 
two cases—— one presenting a strong case for each side——to learn the 
potential outside limits of the value of the rest of the caseload,121 and (or) 
use a randomly selected case from a small group which each side has been 
able to modify by striking those cases seen to be highly favorable to the 
other side.  Depending on which facts are thought to be outcome 
determinative, it may also be possible to undertake “stratified random 
sampling, an established statistical procedure for selecting predictive 
groups” to generate suitable bellwether trials.122  The use of bellwether 
trials requires faith that juries will share the parties’ views of which facts 
drive verdicts.  Sometimes they do not, and the verdicts are not predictable 
even after a series of trials.123 
Expedited jury trials are something of an experiment in California.124 
Under law as modified for 2016, eight jurors are selected, each side gets 
five hours for trial, and the case is done within a day or two.  The bases for 
appeal are limited.  Originally developed for simple cases such as minor 
traffic accidents and contract disputes, the model can be used for anything 
the parties desire.  With a cooperative judge, the time for trial can be 
extended, a couple of alternate jurors used, and other modifications may be 
had.  For complex litigation, this model allows the parties to slice off a key 
fact issue as to which one side or the other insists on a jury determination, 
and have it very rapidly dealt with long before the parties must gear up for 
the ultimate (and very expensive) trial. 
E. Special Master 
Outside professionals, often but not always lawyers, can be of great 
use in some cases.  Typically the label “special masters” suggests they are 
 
 121.  Joseph F. Madonia & Anthony G. Hopp, Case Management Techniques in 
Complex Tort Litigation, 17 NAT. RES. & ENV’T, 238, 241 (2003). 
 122.  Richard O. Faulk et. al., Building A Better Mousetrap? A New Approach to Trying 
Mass Tort Cases 29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 779, 784, 796 (1998).  As this article suggests, a 
critical premise of bellwether trials is that the important facts for all the cases are well-
known (that the litigation is “mature”); otherwise it is probably impossible to speak of a 
“representative” cases at all.  See also Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in 
Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2344 (2008) (discussing that separately from 
the use of bellwether trials to set the stage for settlement is the issue of preclusive effect of 
the first trial on the others). 
 123.  Peter H. Schuck, Judicial Avoidance of Juries in Mass Tort Litigation, 48 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 479, 484-85 (1998). 
 124.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. §§ 630.01–630.12 (West 2015); CAL. R. CT. 3.1545–
3.1552.  As of January 1, 2016, the provisions as modified will continue in force.  As of 
2016, many “limited” cases (where the demand is for less than $25,000) must be tried under 
these provisions. Assemb. 555, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal 2015). 
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acting on behalf of and are responsible to the court.  But that term does not 
have technical meaning in California state courts.  Instead, the court may 
appoint or endorse the parties’ use of a referee.125  There is considerably 
more flexibility to do this in a complex case,126 and typically referees are 
used for two purposes: manage discovery and settlement.127  In some cases, 
and especially construction defect litigation, the referee does both, almost 
always at the behest of the parties.  In some cases, the referee may be 
needed to review, for example, enormous quantities of documents which 
are the focus of a discovery dispute.  In certain areas, such as construction 
defect litigation, these referees are highly efficient— and it is just for that 
reason the parties want them.  It can be easier to get more time from a 
referee, and at a convenient time for the lawyers.128  Otherwise, their use is 
discouraged.129  There are at least three reasons.  First, the courts ought to 
be handling judicial work; it is peculiar to make the parties pay for what is 
an essential service of the state.  (I distinguish the imposition of these costs 
on a party responsible for some abusive tactic which made it necessary to 
hire a referee.) Second, it may be awkward where one or more parties 
cannot afford the referee; and if one side pays all the expenses, that 
generates its own awkward problem, a problem of optics, we might say.130  
Third, a discovery dispute hearing should be thought of as a potential case 
management conference, an opportunity to have further helpful discussions 
and perhaps intervention from the court; for the fight might actually have 
been sparked by some other covert but systemic problem.  Farming out all 
the discovery disputes gives up one good technique of tracking the progress 
of the case. 
F. Bench trials 
First, a few words on complexity at trial.  In many “complex 
litigation” cases, the complexity is not at trial so much as it is in pretrial 
 
 125.  CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 638 (West 2015). 
 126.  See Weil et al., supra note 70, at ¶ 12:47.9a (discussing the use of referees in 
complex cases). 
 127.  A court may not require parties to submit to mediation conducted by a referee.  
CAL. R. CT. 3.920(b).  But the parties can opt to have anyone conduct a mediation, and in 
some cases they ask the “special master” to do so. 
 128.  See Terry Friedman (J., ret.), “The Appointment of Discovery Referees in Complex 
Litigation,” L.A. LAW. 23 (Oct. 2011) (discussing the benefits with using a discovery 
referee). 
 129.  See Taggares v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 387 (Ct. App. 1998) (discussing 
the utility of using a discovery referee). 
 130.  Id., at 397 (holding that, even though the plaintiff is indigent, the defendant cannot 
be ordered to pay the entire referee fee). 
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management (so this note has focused on pretrial, not trial work).  By the 
time a construction defect case gets to trial, there may only be left the 
relatively modest claims of a general contractor against a single 
subcontractor; a mass tort trial might present relatively simple allegations 
that one drug affected one patient.  A class action which is not certified 
might end up as a small claims action with a single plaintiff.  As a result, it 
may be wise to de-complexify a case when there is nothing left to warrant 
more than routine judicial handling. 
Nevertheless, jury trials are more complicated than bench trials (in my 
last example, the small claims case ends up as a bench trial in any event).  
Bench trials allow the judge to decide the key issues in the case in a less 
formal and constrained venue than the jury trial.  A bifurcated bench trial 
allows the parties to peel out a key issue and have it resolved early in the 
case.  It is a powerful phasing mechanism, and may go far, very far, in 
reducing uncertainty.  For this reason some parties will embrace it, and 
others will not.  If the issue at stake is entitled to a jury trial, the only thing 
a judge can do is order a bifurcated jury trial.  In most instances, the parties 
must agree to the bench trial; indeed, as the first sentence of this paragraph 
suggests, it is exactly where a jury right exists that the bench trial is so 
promising from a management perspective.131 
The bench trial, as such, is a control.  It helps govern not only trial, but 
pre-trial actions for the following reasons. 
First, bench trials tend to minimize the pursuit of discovery and 
argument which are not directed to the merits, that is, so-called “jury 
appeal” issues.  To be sure, lawyers will still believe that judges can be 
affected by these things, and will paint the other side as evil, malingering, a 
giant uncaring company, greedy, obstructionist and so on, but there is less 
of this when they know a bench trial is in the offing.  Thus the number of 
outlier issues pursued by the parties is reduced.  In any event, lawyers will 
still make good faith and important arguments on the credibility of 
witnesses or the plausibility of a position. 
Pre-trial preparation is less complex for bench trials, specifically 
because bench trials are less complex than jury trials. 
The most significant advantage of the bench trial in complex cases is 
that the parties can find their way as they go.  Bench trials may be far 
superior where legal issues are novel, admissibility is uncertain, and a fairly 
wide variety of evidence may be relevant, or not, depending on some 
difficult, ultimate decisions by the judge.  In jury trials most of these 
decisions must be made in advance: The jury instructions, jury verdicts, 
 
 131.  I emphasize: from a management perspective.  Parties have perfectly good reasons 
for insisting on the right to a jury, complexities or no, and I suggest no position on the 
competence of juries to address complex issues and reach a reasonable result.  See note 135. 
ARTICLE 1 (KARNOW) (DO NOT DELETE) 12/31/15  1:24 PM 
2015] COMPLEXITY IN LITIGATION 61 
 
and so on, must be attended to before the jury is about to be instructed, that 
is, before the evidence has all come in and been absorbed.  To avoid the 
shock wave effect many judges want at least substantial settlement of these 
issues before the trial even starts.  For example, where there is a reasonable 
argument that the expert should not testify at all, a judge faced with a jury 
trial may have to schedule a pretrial hearing, listing to testimony perhaps 
for days132 in order to rule on the admissibility of the expert’s testimony—
and if it is admissible, the expert will then have to testify all over again. 
In jury trials, evidentiary ruling have to be made on the spot, perhaps 
before it is clear which theory governs liability or exactly what the scope of 
that theory is.  Bench trials provide the luxury of admitting substantial 
amounts of evidence (e.g. exhibits and depositions) prophylactically as it 
were, without taking up much court time, which may after reflection be 
discounted or ignored by the judge given a certain decision on the law; but 
all of which are still part of the record and so can be shown to the court of 
appeal. 
As a result of all these factors, preparation for a bench trial is less 
complex and time consuming than for a jury trial. 
Bench trials can be scheduled for non-consecutive days: this can allow 
a much, much earlier trial than if a jury were required; indeed, in a busy 
single assignment court, this can make over a year’s difference.  Because 
the very same case will cost significantly more when litigated over a period 
of e.g. 3 years than 2 years, advancing trials like this will always save 
money. 
Many useful pretrial management techniques, which effectively group 
parties into collectives, are not available at a jury trial.  During pre-trial, the 
court can appoint or accept liaison counsel and steering committees, require 
or allow parties to simply join in motions (or limit oral argument) when 
they have nothing unique to add, require joint submissions of e.g. case 
management conference statements and other papers, and so on.  In the 
event of jury trials specifically, much of this flexibility disappears.  In jury 
trials, the time for and complexity of many procedures rises as a function of 
the number of parties.  For example, each party may have its own 
witnesses, each party has a right to ask questions of every witness, to ask 
questions at voir dire, to make an opening and a closing, to be heard on 
most legal issues including every juror bias issue, evidentiary ruling, jury 
instruction, special verdict form, and so on.  The number of preemptory 
 
 132.  See Sargon Enters., Inc. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 288 P.3d 1237 (Cal. 2012) (holding 
eight days of pretrial hearings).  See generally, Curtis Karnow, Sargon and the Science of 
Reliable Experts, 22.1 ABTL REPORT 1 (2013), 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=curtis_karnow, 
archived at http://perma.cc/U9SJ-DG98(discussing the admission of expert testimony). 
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challenges also usually rises as the number of parties rise, but is capped by 
the number of “sides” at trial.133 To be sure, parties still have some of these 
rights in a bench trial, such as opening, closing, and asking questions of 
witnesses, but because lawyers are properly content to have much of the 
evidence in paper format, as opposed to the real-time oral presentations 
required at a jury trial, these rights are not so often invoked: In a bench 
trial, the bulk of opening and closing is done with trial and post-trial briefs 
and witnesses can be presented through deposition extracts and having 
direct testimony by way of declarations, reserving the right to live cross 
examination.  Certainly motions in limine can be filed in both sorts of 
trials, but they are not usually useful, and sometimes utterly pointless, in a 
bench trial.134 
Think of it this way.  The jury trial is the ultimate shock wave.  Every 
single bit of evidence has to be assembled and ready to go, generally 
delivered orally (no matter how scriptory or complicated the evidence is).135  
 
 133.  This is one of the few techniques judges do have at trial to collect parties into 
larger categories: many or all defendants, for example, may be on the same “side” and so 
may have to jointly exercise one set of peremptory challenges.  CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 
231(c) (West 2015). 
 134.  Because the proper purpose of these motions is to ensure the jury is not exposed to 
inadmissible evidence, they are of less use for bench trials.  See Edwards v. Centex Real 
Estate Corp., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 529 (Ct. App. 1997) (“The purpose of a motion in limine 
is ‘to avoid the obviously futile attempt to “unring the bell” in the event a motion to strike is 
granted in the proceedings before the jury.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Hyatt v. Sierra Boat 
Co., 145 Cal. Rptr. 47, 59 (Ct. App. 1978))).  Some judges believe these sorts of motions are 
just out of place in a bench trial.  E.g., John N. Sharifi, Techniques for Defense Counsel in 
Criminal Bench Trials, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 687 (2005); Randy Wilson, The Bench 
Trial: It Really Is Different, ADVOCATE, Summer 2009, 
http://www.justex.net/JustexDocuments/12/Articles/Bench%20Trial.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/GR5E-2PBB; Bonnie Sudderth, Limine Motions – Their Uses and 
Limitations, Judge Bonnie Sudderth L. Blog on the Tex. Rules of Evidence, (July 9, 2011) 
http://judgebonniesudderth.wordpress.com/tag/motion-in-limine/, archived at 
https://perma.cc/SA7N-UH74 (explaining in limine motions should not be filed in a bench 
trial).  It is pointless to file in limine motions in a bench trial when the asserted problem is 
prejudice under CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 2015), because judges usually can be relied 
on avoid the bias, and, more practically, because the same judge will be viewing the 
evidence to evaluate it in the section 352 analysis anyway.  Too, when the main issue is 
undue consumption of time under § 352, in limine motions are pointless when either little 
time is at stake, or when about the same amount of time would be expended on for example, 
an Evidence Code section 402, CAL. EVID. CODE § 402 (West 2015), pretrial hearing (or 
reading voluminous depositions extracts or reviewing the documents) as at trial. 
 135.  Jury trials in complex cases present special difficulties, because juror competence 
may decline as complexity rises.  Matthew A. Reiber et al., The Complexity of Complexity: 
An Empirical Study of Juror Competence in Civil Cases, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 929, 955-62 
(2010); see also Andrew J. Wilhelm, Complex Litigation in the New Era of the iJury, 41 
PEPP. L. REV. 817, 851-55 (2014) (explaining that using technology to present information 
to jurors will allow jurors to understand complex cases).  But see Richard C. Waites et al., 
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Misfires generally cannot be fixed.  There are few recourses available after 
a jury is discharged.  The bench trial, even if set for the same number of 
days, is far more flexible; its moving parts are not quite so closely coupled.  
In the words of complexity theory, the impact of small unpredictable events 
(such as a sick witness, a lost document, an unforeseen ruling on 
admissibility such as that on an expert or because a theory was not clearly 
pled in a complaint or as an affirmative defense) is likely to be far greater 
in a jury than a bench trial.  A ferocious amount of pretrial work is needed 
to account for the contingencies of jury trials, some of it just because a jury 
is involved. 
VII. CONCLUSION: THE PROBABLE CASE 
Every settlement judge and mediator has had this moment.  A lawyer 
or party is expressing a firm conviction that he will prevail, and prevail 
utterly, obliterating the other side.  The defendant will destroy the plaintiff 
and present a costs bill of half a million dollars.  Or the plaintiff will win 
millions in pain and suffering, plus enormous punitive damages.  There 
may be good tactical reasons for taking this approach in a settlement 
conference, such as trying to modify the other side’s expectations, 
anchoring the discussions, manifesting resolve, and so on.  But some 
actually believe the extreme positions they articulate,136 and that’s where 
the negotiations break down.  These folks are fixed on a possible outcome.  
Their forecast may indeed be possible, but because it is not probable it fails 
to move the case along, and communication with the other side is 
threatened. 
Remotely possible positions are outliers; as with the lottery effect, 
they are a bad basis on which to pursue a case. 
Complex litigation tends towards what I term the possible case.  I have 
described the incentives, motivations, and power of parties in these cases to 
pursue outlier issues, and indeed the techniques used by judges that 
sometimes enable this.  Parties want every last email and every deposition.  
They may be able to afford the one-in-a-million long shot.  They must 
make every argument.  From the perspective of each individual actor—the 
lawyers, the parties, perhaps the insurers, many (perhaps all) of the 
 
Are Jurors Equipped to Decide the Outcome of Complex Cases?, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
19, 44 (2005) (discussing how trial lawyers can help jurors understand complex issues).  
These concerns suggest a variety of techniques should be used at trial to help the jury.  
 136.  Daniel Kahneman et al., Hawkish Bias, (2009) 
http://www.princeton.edu/~kahneman/docs/Publications/Hawkish%20Biases.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/B7K3-E4AG (reprinted in AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POLITICS 
OF FEAR 76-96 (A. Trevor Thrall et al. eds. 1st ed. 2009)). 
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witnesses including hired experts and others with a stake in the outcome—
these may well be rational positions.  The more complex the case, the more 
acute the intuitions that: (i) much is uncertain and (ii) some shift, perhaps 
some further iota of information, might influence the outcome.  And it 
might. 
But this approach never reaches an EIP—the early (short of trial) 
inflection point for serious settlement discussions—because the parties 
never reach a perfect case.  There is always, always, money left on the 
table.  When every possible avenue is pursued, only a trial can terminate 
the case, and not even that because there is always the appeal.  Managing 
such a case to settlement is doomed. 
To counter this dysfunction, judges must direct the parties away from 
the possible case to the probable case.  We ask, rhetorically, what are likely 
to be the decisive issues, the key documents and witnesses, the core 
depositions? Judges try to move as directly as possible to those issues, and 
detours are not justified just because the parties can afford them or indeed 
just because they agree to them. 
Judicial intervention is guided, I think, by a variant of the rule 
popularized by Carl Sagan, to the effect that “extraordinary claims require 
extraordinary evidence.”  I need little to convince you I have a white cat 
named Lilly; I need much more to have you believe I also raise zebras.  So 
too with outlier issues: The less likely the task is to make a difference to the 
case, the greater the resistance of the court to spend time on it and the 
greater the showing required that the court and parties should spend 
resources on it. 
But this is just a default, and as with all defaults it must sometimes be 
thrown overboard.  The next case may involve new technologies, new 
economic relationships, the first application of a statute; and an “outlier” 
might herald an important new area of law. 
 
